US Median Home Price 1965-2009
Gray area is “Inflation” period of 1972-1983, 201% total increase in home prices during that 12 year period, or 10.5% annually.
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Consumer Price Index 1965-2009
Gray area is “Inflation” period of 1972-1983, 147% total increase in CPI during that 12 year period, or 8.5% annually.
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CPI vs. Median Home Price 1972-1983
Close up of the gray area, home prices seemed to outpace inflation a bit during the peak inflation late ’70s early ’80s.
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CPI vs. Median Home Price (y/y change) 1972-1987
Extended the view a bit, on the way up Home Price change peaked before CPI (’72) and bottomed first as well (’80, ‘82). Home prices off to the races again in the mid-late ’80s.
(click image to enlarge)

30-yr Fixed Mortgage rates vs. Median Home Price 1972-1987
Home price gains slowed as rates ramped, but even with 18% rates annual home price change only briefly declined.
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30-yr Fixed Mortgage Rates vs. Median Home Price 1972-1987
As shown above, high rates slowed down increases but declines did not last long and prices started going up again when they lowered rates.
(click image to enlarge)

This post first appeared on Minyanville.

We have truly become a bailout nation.

As regulators mull over the possibility of rescuing CIT Group (CIT) — a small-business lender that counts over 1 million US firms as customers — analysts debate whether the relatively small firm is deserving of a taxpayer-funded bailout. Or for that matter, a bailout at all.

After converting to a bank holding company last year, CIT received $2.3 billion in TARP money to help solidify its financial footing. Yet even this injection of taxpayer capital couldn’t prevent its financial position from deteriorating further, and the company now faces the maturity of over $1 billion in bonds next month. Without government support, CIT doesn’t believe it will survive the summer.

The specter for a CIT bailout is a tricky political issue: It pits those that argue Washington must step in wherever necessary to support the reeling US economy, against those who are starting to wonder when the bailouts will stop and when bureaucrats will step back and allow the free market to determine who survives.

Few would argue that CIT presents a systemic risk to the US financial system; with a balance sheet of around $75 billion, the company is one-eighth the size of Lehman Brothers, according to research firm BTIG.

CIT is, however, a key lender to small businesses around the country. This means its failure could threaten salary payments for millions of American workers if the company’s customers are unable to get lines of credit with other financial institutions. Under different circumstances, banks like Wells Fargo (WFC), Citigroup (C), and Bank of America (BAC) would be eagerly serving CIT’s clients. Instead, they’re focused on reining in lending of their own.

If CIT were to fail, it would mark the biggest bank failure since Washington Mutual — now part of JPMorgan Chase (JPM) — collapsed last September.

By letting CIT fail and coordinating an orderly shuttering of its operations, the Obama administration has the opportunity to re-establish an old precedent long since forgotten in these turbulent economic times: Firms that should fail actually fail.

If, instead, the government rescues CIT, the yardstick by which we measure “Too Big to Fail” will be severely shortened. This wouldn’t be a welcome development.

For the past year, government power brokers — rather than market forces — have picked the winners and losers as financial firms have been besieged by a massive deflationary debt unwind. Further, as Washington wades deeper and deeper into the day-to-day operations of American business, companies are starting to compete for government cash, not customers.

Moral hazard is a concept quickly brushed to the side during times of crisis, but it’s precisely during these trying times that market principles should be the most firmly upheld. Sadly, over the past 24 months, the opposite has held true.

By ANDREW JEFFERY

This post first appeared on Minyanville.

Deflation, the economic beast many feared would devour the next decade, appears to have been vanquished.

Or has it?

Superficial signs of renewed inflation are everywhere: Oil prices appear to be stabilizing, and concern is growing about future supply shortages (which, by extension, could lead to higher prices at the pump). The stock market has staged an impressive rally, with expectant bulls and former bears finding for “green shoots” of economic growth everywhere. Home prices, if you look purely at the data and ignore fundamentals, are starting to slow their fantastic decline.

Even the consumer price index, or CPI, is looking tame. Well, except for last month’s drop, the largest in more than 50 years.

And herein lies the problem.

The CPI, the market’s favorite inflation gauge, has been masking the structural deflation in our midst since the housing market fell of its wheels almost 4 years ago. Given the precipitous drop in property values, one would naturally expect the housing component of the CPI to fall in kind. Not so.

The statistical alchemists, err, experts, at the Bureau of Labor Statistics use something called “owners equivalent rent,” OER, to measure consumer housing expenses. OER tries to approximate the cost to rent the country’s typical home, and according to the Wall Street Journal makes up 24% of the CPI and 31% of the core CPI, which backs out food and energy costs.

And since even as property values have slid in record-breaking fashion rents remained buoyant, OER has vastly understated the drop in home prices. This means the CPI — were it to reflect some sort of economic reality — would have fallen more than it actually has.

As the housing slump rolls on, the pain is increasingly being felt by landlords, not just owner occupiers. Rents in big cities like New York and San Francisco are already dropping, as would-be tenants demand concessions from property owners. Vacancies are increasing, as even those driven from the housing market by foreclosures and the tight mortgage market can’t fill up empty apartments, condos and track homes.

Drive around suburbia and “For Rent” signs are nearly as common as “For Sale” signs.

Rents are likely to keep falling and as a result, OER could begin to drag down the CPI. Of course, statisticians can and likely will play games with adjustments for volatile energy prices (renters often don’t pay for utilities, so energy costs are backed out of OER). Further, government bean counters are even considering adapting OER to reflect new, high levels of home ownership (just in time for a reversion to the historic mean, thanks for being ahead of the curve guys).

As long as construing economic data in a way that makes it seem more likely for effectively insolvent financial institutions like Bank of America (BAC) and Citigroup (C) to raise capital and remain in business, that will remain the status quo.

Meanwhile, back in reality, saving is now en vogue, deleveraging is ongoing and the repayment (and destruction) of dollar-denominated debt will keep inflation in check for the foreseeable future. More importantly, the recognition that smaller can be better and less can be more are becoming entrenched in the lives of ordinary Americans.

Don’t believe the hype: Deflation isn’t going away any time soon.

By ANDREW JEFFERY

This post first appeared on Minyanville.

In its ongoing attempt to rewrite the rules of what’s quickly becoming our quasi-capitalist nation, the Obama Administration is weighing options that would expand compensation restrictions to all corners of the financial-services industry.

According to the New York Times, well-publicized efforts to rein in executive pay at firms that accepted TARP money could extend to companies that have thus far stayed off the government dole. In other words, the spottily regulated world of hedge funds and private equity could be subject to some of the same restrictions faced by their government-subsidized competitors.

However unpleasant, firms like Citigroup (C) and Bank of America (BAC) (both in hock to the US taxpayer for hundreds of billions of dollars) have lost their right to be the masters of their own executive compensation destiny. On the other hand, pay at hedge funds that haven’t touched a penny of government money should be determined by the firms themselves.

Since he took office, President Obama has been a loud advocate for pay that’s closely tied to performance. The prevailing view in Washington is that Wall Street traders were able to take on massive risk — either their firm’s or their clients’ — without feeling much pain if the bets went sideways. This led to excessive risk-taking, and the kind of near-criminal alchemy that ultimately blew up the financial lab.

And while this is true to an extent, the result of this typical government overreaction will be a system reduction of risk - and by extension, of reward. Financiers, entrepreneurs and businesspeople of all types engage in risky behavior every day - which is what keeps the economy humming.

Systematically reduce the incentive to take risks, and economic output will slow. It’s simple math.

Already, even as Washington bumbles its way towards legislation on executive pay, what’s left of the free market is sorting things out on its own.

Raising capital is well-nigh impossible for upstart hedge funds, as even management teams with strong credentials are struggling to get off the ground. Existing funds, most of which remain below their so-called “high-water mark” (the level at which juicy performance incentive fees kick in), won’t see big bonus payouts until well into 2010.

This is the market at work, punishing bad actors — even ones that were just marginally bad — and creating an environment where only the most astute, talented, and driven can succeed.

By contrast, as policymakers look to make up for years of ignoring their fiduciary responsibility to safeguard the public interest, we’re witnessing the development of an economic system that benefits only the most well-connected.

Needless to say, this is an unwelcome progression.

By ANDREW JEFFERY

This post first appeared on Minyanville.

Of the myriad highbrow economic debates currently raging throughout the world of punditry, academia and government policy, few are as contentious as the one over the future of prices: Inflation vs. Deflation.

Indeed, the endgame for this issue is not insignificant, as many believe our economic future hinges on the Federal Reserve’s ability to deftly engineer a return to steady, manageable inflation. To say the least, this is no easy task.

With the unemployment marching upwards, credit markets still largely frozen and global trade grinding to a halt, the American economy is in desperate need of a monetary jolt. The trouble for Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke is that with interest rates already at zero, he’s being forced to rely on so-called “quantitative easing” to pump money into our badly bruised financial system.

These efforts are being managed through the alphabet soup of new lending programs like TALF, TAF, CPFF and others.

Meanwhile, a glut of savings from the developing world coupled with reckless financial alchemy caused debt loads to skyrocket to unsustainable levels. The ongoing destruction of that debt, discussed often by Minyanville’s Kevin Depew and Mr. Practical, is now raging at full speed, as assets of all types have come screaming back to earth.

Bloomberg highlights the debate by focusing on 2 highly regarded economists with divergent views on inflation and its causes.

John Maynard Keynes, a 20th century British economist gained notoriety for his thesis that inflation was controlled by supply-demand fundamentals within an economy. He advanced the view that well-directed government spending could help a country balance economic growth with a moderate, healthy rise in prices.

Western politicians jumped on the Keynesian bandwagon during much of the last century to support a vast expansion in government spending and intrusion into the private sector.

Opposing Keynes was Milton Friedman, who instead believed that “inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.” Friedman’s focus on monetary policy, that is, interest rates and controlling the flow of money through a country’s economy, clashed with the Keynesian view that inflation could be controlled with fiscal measures and legislation.

Bernanke is doubling down on Keynes, evidenced by recent lending initiatives, bailouts of financial institutions like American International Group (AIG) and his support of President Barack Obama’s massive fiscal spending program. The Fed’s involvement in cleaning up the balance sheets of Citigroup (C) and Bank of America (BAC), along with efforts to jumpstart the mortgage market have also diminished its ability to remain apolitical and tend solely to the needs of the economy.

The Fed’s gamble is a bold one, as inflating our way out of a deflationary debt unwind could lead to a rapid, uncontrollable rise in prices should the economy rebound sooner than expected.

For example, big oil companies like Exxon Mobil (XOM) and Chevron (CVX) will be reticent to invest in new technologies or drill new wells should crude prices remain low. Limited production capacity could squeeze supply when demand picks back up, leading to a rise in prices.

This trend of firms retrenching in response to rapidly waning demand for goods is being mirrored throughout the economy. And although the Fed promises to take back the monetary stimulus when the economic growth returns, the timing and political implications of such a move are anything but a slam dunk.

And unlike other more esoteric debates over economic ideology, the result of the inflation vs. deflation slugfest has real implications for all Americans.

Inflation, while generally viewed as a necessary evil for economic growth, lines the pockets of those invested in financial and other economic assets at the expense of those on the lower rungs of the economic ladder. If real incomes rose at the same rate prices did since the Fed was created in 1913, they would currently stand at $300,000 per year, six times the current median household income of around $50,000.

In other words, Americans earn about 80% less, in real terms, than they did 100 years ago.

Deflation, while causing a drag on the economy at large, benefits those making less money as each additional dollar they earn stretches further. Meanwhile, at the top of the economic spectrum, the wealthy dislike deflation since their stocks, bonds, commodities, homes and Rolexes all fall in value.

As calls for a stock market bottom and impending economic recovery gain momentum, so too will predictions of rampant inflation. Ironically, Bernanke and fellow central bankers around the world are counting on the hangover from the financial crisis to be bad enough to forestall a resurgence in demand and enable them to slowly, carefully withdraw their monetary steroids.

Whether that will be possible, or even politically acceptable is anybody’s guess.