This article first appeared on Minyanville.

A piece in this weekend’s New York Times contends that the golden era of real estate is over. The author, David Streitfeld, argues that for the foreseeable future (and possibly forever), a home will simply be four walls and a roof, ceasing to be the lucrative financial investment it’s been since the end of World War II. The premise is mildly compelling, particularly given the dour housing data of the past couple months. But to argue that real estate as an asset class is dead is to grossly misunderstand not only housing, but the nature of human progress itself.

After five years of a housing depression that brought the entire global financial system to its knees, it’s easy to get behind the argument that housing is dead: Shadow inventory is looming, government incentives are running their course, the employment outlook is cloudy at best, and people are thinking twice about plunking down a life’s savings for the privilege of 30-years of indebtedness.

Moreover, according to Streitfeld and the housing economists he quotes, a shockingly large portion of Americans’ disposable income over the past several decades was generated through real estate appreciation. Not only did banks like Wells Fargo (WFC) and JPMorgan Chase (JPM) get rich off originating, packaging, and selling mortgages, but cruise operators like Carnival Corp (CCL) and Royal Caribbean (RCL) and gadget-makers like Apple (AAPL) and Research in Motion (RIMM) cashed in as homeowners cashed out.

And while all this is true, to say that “real estate’s gold rush seems gone for good,” is to lump Silicon Valley in with the Wasatch Mountains, Daytona Beach with Huntington Beach. Articles like Streitfeld’s make for interesting chatter at the water cooler and cocktail parties where being bearish on housing is all the rage, but they miss the larger point that progress and development are ongoing, and there are good long-term real estate investments out there if you know where to look — even if you’re just looking for a place to raise your family.

The bearish thesis breaks down when you look at what it means to actually buy a house, and what factors effect the future price of that particular home. Buying a house isn’t the same as investing in the “housing market.” Not even close. The argument relies on the naive, yet now-popular belief that the same factors that make taking a flier on a Vegas condo risky must, by extension, also make buying a starter home in Austin, Texas, a dicey proposition.

Rather, buying a home is investing in a neighborhood, a community which may or may not be squarely in the path of demographic patterns that were set in motion well before our country had ever heard the term “subprime.” If done right, a happy medium can be found between finding a place you want to live and settling down in what may even turn out to be a good investment.

Population shifts evolve over decades, not years, and are based on fundamental factors that run deeper than short-term blips in the national, or even regional economy. Demographic movements, not short-sighted speculation, are behind the creation of real estate wealth in the long run. These shifts explain why rural towns with stagnant populations won’t see appreciation for decades (if ever), while regions with expanding job markets and a growing population are ripe for smart investment (yes, such areas exist, even now).

At the same time, established, snobbish communities of aging baby boomers may see home prices flatline for years, while buyers in many gritty, neighborhoods on the fringe currently far outweigh sellers. In these markets, prices are creeping back up based on fundamentals, not government crutches.

So as stubborn housing bears drone on, spouting their frail generalities, the precious few of us with vision to see beyond next quarter’s GDP data will be the landlords of the future.

This post first appeared in the June edition of: Cirios Trends: In Search of Real Estate Opportunities

Humans, as a species, are lousy fortunetellers.

A few intrepid visionaries aside, most people simply cannot grasp what the world will look like in 20, 10 or even five years.

And for good reason. Trying to envision the future doesn’t mean picking some individual aspect of society and dreaming up “how cool would it be if …” Proper forecasting requires taking into account all aspects of human interaction, projecting advances in each area out into the future, envisioning a world with those new, unknown rules, then deriving a hypothesis within that framework.

Investing - whether it be real estate or stocks - requires just that predictive aptitude in order to make truly good decisions. The ability to look forward and predict what things may be like based on a set of projections is what separates great investors from those who are content with “market” returns.

In real estate, effective forecasting is impossible without examining and understanding demographic shifts. Populations move slowly, but with great inertia. Trends develop over time, based on fundamental factors that develop over decades, not years or months.

Ask any successful real estate investor and they will tell you that getting in front of demographic movements is the best way to build real estate wealth. Time horizons may vary wildly, whether one is spotting hipster migration within a city that typically foretells more affluent gentrification; or entire towns that over 60 years transformed into an almost exclusively upper middle class Asian-American community.

But how can you know, before, and buy accordingly? And here we are back to the human inability to predict the future.

This month’s Cirios Trends is devoted to one of the most controversial, yet potentially important development projects in the Bay Area, and how its relative success or failure could accelerate a demographic sea change in San Francisco that is already underway.

The Hunters Point/Bayview neighborhood is best known for being the most dangerous part of San Francisco. Gang violence is common, the streets are far from safe and, as one might expect, home prices are lower here than anywhere else in the city.

But Hunters Point also includes the largest untouched piece of land within the San Francisco city limits. Mired in environmental, social and political controversy for decades, plans to redevelop Hunters Point are edging closer to reality. Coupled with ongoing socioeconomic changes in San Francisco, the project is part of a potentially massive shift in demographic orientation within the city.

In the following pages, we barely scratch the surface of what the successful redevelopment of this area could mean for the city. In order to truly grasp the potential opportunities, sit back, close your eyes and imagine a world that is, in a word, unimaginable. (Click here to read the next story)

This post first appeared on Minyanville.

The Obama Administration’s latest salvo in the war against foreclosures, Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives, or HAFA, is but a week old and already America’s real estate establishment is trying to cash in.

HAFA aims to step in where Home Affordable Modification Program, or HAMP, fails. In other words, when borrowers are so far behind or upside down that a modification doesn’t make sense, HAFA tries to provide an alternative. Whether it be through Short Sale, where lenders let borrowers sell their homes for less than the amount of the outstanding mortgage, or “deeds-in-lieu,” where homeowners hand their lenders the keys in exchange for absolution of the debt, Washington wants to make getting out from under crippling mortgage debt a little bit easier.

Realtors are licking their chops.

Short sales are notoriously tough to get done, since voluminous requests have bogged down the back offices of big banks like JPMorgan Chase (JPM), Wells Fargo (WFC), and Bank of America (BAC). Approving short sales can take months, and real estate agents lose commissions when buyers walk for lack of patience or if they find another deal. As a result, short sales sell at as much as a 10%-15% discount to regular sales or even bank-owned homes, simply because most buyers (and agents) don’t want to deal with the headache.

HAFA wants to fix all that. By providing cash incentives for interested parties (lenders, loan servicers, and borrowers) to push through short sales, Washington has devised yet another way to try and help distressed homeowners. But as I wrote last week in The Unintended Consequences of Treasury’s HAFA Program, these payments may be too small to push a material number of short sales through the system.

When a buyer makes an offer on a short sale, it first must be approved by the homeowner, then sent on for approval by the bank. More often than not, sellers place the asking price as high as possible in hopes that an offer will be good enough to get the bank’s attention. And more often than not, overpriced short sales get stale as buyers move on in favor of better, lower-priced homes.

But in the few days since the Treasury Department announced HAFA, a strange thing has started happening. Short sale prices are being slashed and buyers are stepping in. The logic makes sense: If you were an underwater borrower (or his or her Realtor), why not slash your asking price to well below the amount you owe, grab an offer, and send it through. You never know what you may get. After all, the president effectively announced that he’d be asking lenders to take it in the shorts for the common good. So banks, eager to keep their names out of the papers as uncooperative, may be eager to fill their government-mandated quota for HAFA short sales and approve just about anything that comes in the door.

And, of course, Realtors then get to collect their commission. A commission which HAFA mandates must be higher than the going rate for distressed sales.

This post first appeared in the April edition of: Cirios Trends: In Search of Real Estate Opportunities.

Every six months or so, Washington’s political will seems to coalesce in support of the only issue where there is true agreement across party lines: The housing market is still broken. Sadly, in our view, the Treasury Department’s Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives Program, or “HAFA,” is simply the latest in a series of flawed legislation aimed more at pacifying popular outrage rather than offering real, tangible solutions to the challenges facing the US housing market.

On April 5th, HAFA will become law, representing the Federal government’s latest assault against the depressed residential housing market. HAFA aims to provide options for homeowners unable to qualify for loan modifications through the Home Affordable Modification Program, or “HAMP,” which was the last government-backed foreclosure prevention initiative.

Indeed, the foreclosure epidemic in this country remains a pressing issue, as recent data indicate that more than five million households are behind on their mortgage payments, with almost three million households 90 days or more delinquent but not yet in foreclosure.

HAFA attempts to step in where permanent modification via HAMP is not a viable option, offering incentives to lenders, servicers and distressed homeowners in the hopes that foreclosures can be cut off at the pass. The primary mechanisms HAFA promotes are short sales, where the lender allows the homeowner to sell his or her home for less than the mortgage amount, and deeds-in-lieu of foreclosure, or “DILs,” where the homeowner hands the lender the keys cooperatively in exchange for the lender agreeing not to pursue back payments. These alternatives are believed to be less damaging to a homeowner’s credit.

While some homeowners will be assisted by HAFA, each group affected by the legislation could see unintended consequences that mitigate the program’s good intentions.

1. Distressed Homeowners
HAFA’s primary goal is to help distressed homeowners. Noble enough, but will the program be effective? First, to incentivize homeowners to cooperate in short sales, Uncle Sam (read: taxpayers) is offering a $1,500 payment for “relocation assistance.” This payment is on top of cash assistance lenders often provide short selling homeowners.

From our experience, however, the decision to short sell is not typically one that is easily swayed by $1,500. If the government wants to help homeowners start over, every little bit helps, but if the aim is to encourage more short sales, this amount of money is but a drop in the bucket and successes will be few and far between.

Second, and almost more important, it’s not even clear short selling truly benefits the homeowner in all cases. Even though the IRS revised rules which previously treated the forgiven loan as taxable income, many states are behind the ball. For example, in California, if a homeowner short sells his home for $400,000 with a $500,000 mortgage outstanding, at year end he could face $100,000 in additional taxable income. A proposed amendment to this law is in limbo because Governor Schwarzenegger has threatened to veto due to an unrelated provision in the bill. For those seeking to enter a short sale, tread lightly and seek tax counseling before agreeing to anything.

2. Lenders / Mortgage Servicers
HAFA also tries to further incentivize lenders and mortgage servicers (who collect payments and administer modification and/or foreclosure proceedings on behalf of lenders) to avoid foreclosure. Lenders and servicers receive a $1,000 bonus for each short sale and Uncle Sam (read: taxpayers) will cough up $1,000 to second lien holders in order to get them to play ball. Second lien holders can gum up short sales by demanding payoffs first lien holders aren’t willing to make. Washington hopes this token payment will encourage second lien holders to cooperate, but in reality a mere $1,000 may not be enough to coax second lien holders’ to take their lumps.

In addition to making short sales more palatable, HAFA makes the foreclosure process even more onerous than it already is. Additional notification to borrowers, a required HAMP review of each file and other hurdles to completing foreclosure aim to push more lenders in the direction of short sales or DILs.

3. Non-Distressed Homeowners
Some of HAFA’s major impacts, to the extent it is successful of course, will be felt by homeowners seemingly untouched by the legislation: Non-distressed homeowners.

While the government wants to delay foreclosures, short sales flooding the market could put downward pressure on home prices. For each successful short sale or DIL, that is one additional home dumped onto the market. Currently short sales are viewed by many buyers as not worth the hassle and that they should not be treated as true supply. If word gets out, however, that lenders are actually cooperating, short sales may lose their negative stigma and start to more strongly impact prices.

Mortgage-paying homeowners could see their property values continue to fall thanks to government efforts to speed short sales to market.

4. Once Again, Taxpayer Loss is Realtor Gain
No analysis of HAFA would be complete without mention of the National Association of Realtors, or NAR, which continues to demonstrate it’s lobbying prowess.

In addition to supporting the legislation because more short sales means more transactions and more commissions for Realtors, the NAR lobbied aggressively for the inclusion of a provision preventing lenders from lowering a Realtor’s commission in a short sale below 6% of the sales price. In distressed transactions, a 5% commission has become the defacto rule, a trend which, much to the NAR’s chagrin, is causing commission compression across even non-distressed housing markets.

Thus, HAFA hands lenders, servicers and homeowners taxpayer dollars, even as it mandates that real estate agents earn more money on each transaction.

So how will it all end? Ultimately, the aforementioned effects will only be felt to the extent the program is an actual success. Will small handouts across many transactions cause actual change?

Will HAFA promote Washington’s stated policy of propping up home prices? Will flooding the market with new short sales add to the backlog of distressed homes working their way through the system or fail and further delay the inevitable normalization of the market?

Time of course will be the true arbiter of the debate, but we’ll be monitoring the program’s successes … and failures.

This post first appeared in the SPECIAL EDITION: Cirios Trends: A Decade in Flux

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Given the widespread expectation for future inflation, and as an extension higher interest rates to combat rising prices, the question above is the most common one we hear from home buyers and real estate investors alike. To try and resolve the issue to completion on this short page would be ambitious, to say the least.

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During the inflationary period of the late seventies and early eighties (flip back to pg 5 for a picture of
inflation during this period), mortgage rates climbed to almost 20%. In a world where locking in a rate north of 5% feels like a rip-off, 20% mortgages are a thing of fantasy.

Yet, despite this seemingly gale force headwind, home prices still climbed. While there are number of reasons for this increase (demographic, regulatory, etc), let’s focus on one in particular: Inflation Expectations.

Thumb through speeches written by pointy-headed Fed economists and you’ll find this phrase, “Inflation Expectations” peppered throughout discussions of monetary policy and the fear of rising prices. This is one of the least appreciated, yet most important aspects of effective use of monetary policy to manage inflation.

At the core, all economic decisions reflect participants’ view of the future. Specifically, buyers consider what utility (ie, use) they can receive and whether the price for that utility is fair. Embedded within this decision is some expectation of what can be done with that money in the future: Saved, spent, invested, etc.

When consumers fear rising prices, that a gallon of gas will cost more tomorrow than it does today, they buy the gas today. This pushes future demand forward, increasing aggregate demand and in turn, prices. The cycle continues, and in extreme cases (think Zimbabwe or the Weimar Republic), hyperinflation ensues.

As inflation rises, so too do Inflation Expectations. Consumers deploy capital towards assets they perceive to be a better store of value than the worthless paper in their pockets. They buy gold, they buy oil, they buy real estate. So, even with higher rates, money still flows into housing.

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This post first appeared in the SPECIAL EDITION: Cirios Trends: A Decade in Flux

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The belief that the Federal Reserve kept interest rates too low, for too long, is one which is now nearly universally held. Well, outside the Fed, that is. Here’s a smattering of quotes which show how the view of Greenspan’s loose monetary policy (and now Bernanke’s) varies from group to group, and from year to year.

“The best response to the housing bubble would have been regulatory, rather than monetary.”
- Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, January 3, 2010

“Given the decloupling of monetary policy from long-term mortgage rates, accelerating the path of monetary tightening that the Fed pursued in 2004-2005 could not have prevented the housing bubble.”
- Former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, March 11, 2009

“The reason I wrote this book was so that the average person could understand the scope of the housing bubble, and what its bursting was going to mean and…where blame should be placed…at Greenspan’s Fed.”
- William Fleckenstein, on his book Greenspan’s Bubbles: The Age of Ignorance at the Federal Reserve

“Bernanke has done a great job, post-Lehman. But going into this crisis, he really was the architect, if not the co-collaborator, in creating some of the conditions in the economy that led to the recession.”
- Stephen Roach, chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia, Ltd, August 25, 2009

“We artificially lower interest rates. It’s been going on for 10 years and longer and now we’re bearing the fruits of that policy.”
- Ron Paul (R-TX) at Chairman Bernanke’s testimony to the Joint Economic Committee, Nov. 8, 2007

“American consumers might benefit if lenders provided greater mortgage product alternatives to the traditional fixed-rate mortgage.”
- Then-Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, during a speech on February 23, 2004

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This post first appeared in the SPECIAL EDITION: Cirios Trends: A Decade in Flux

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Since we just spent the last ten pages laboriously scratching the surface of complex macroeconomic trends with a few over-simplified charts, we will now analyze every single US housing market by looking at sales data in two cities.

As we wrote in April 2009, “The bifurcation of the real estate market continues, as troubles in the high end are picking up the slack while low-end markets grope for a bottom.” This trend has persisted for months, and as foreclosures creep into higher end markets, we believe the trend will persist for the foreseeable future.

Below are sales transactions for the past ten years in East Palo Alto. East Palo Alto, which in 1992 had the dubious distinction of being “murder capital, USA” by tallying the highest murder-per-capita rate in the entire country, has undergone a renaissance of sorts. Sort of.

As Silicon Valley wealth swelled during the dot-com boom, so too did housing prices. One of the last bastions of affordability on the Peninsula, real estate speculators flocked to this rough town for high risk, high reward development. The town experienced a decade of gentrification on steroids, as home prices became completely unhinged with the economic prospects of the area’s residents.

This story was repeated in cities across the country, each with it’s own unique flare. Vegas condos went through the roof. Track homes in Phoenix were flipped monthly by amateur and professional real estate speculators alike. Waterfront homes in the quiet town of Cape Coral, FL approached $1 million apiece.

But now, as prices in these markets have returned to earth, buyers are wading back in, armed with government loans, tax credits and a newfound fear of the stock market. Inventory is being constricted by ongoing foreclosure moratoria and in certain markets, prices have begun to stabilize.

The arrow below points out the steep price declines from 2007-2008 on few sales transactions. The shaded circle shows buyers stepping back in and prices groping for a bottom.

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On the other side of Highway 101, the city of Palo Alto exists in precise contradiction to its neighbor to the east. Quiet streets, large lots and excellent schools make Palo Alto one of the most desirable places to raise a family in the entire country. Home prices, as one would expect, are very, very high.

Palo Alto residents have had decades of prosperity to accumulate wealth, and a few bad months in the stock market or the loss of a job doesn’t necessarily spell financial ruin. Fewer mortgage defaults, less dependence on credit cards and a general affluence meant that the bubble popped here later, and with less vigor. In other words, the “Price Discovery” (ie, a precipitous drop in prices resulting from a void of buyers, only to be stabilized as buyers step back into the market looking for bargains) that has occurred in East Palo Alto is yet to come to well-to-do areas like Palo Alto.

As can be seen from the green shaded oval below, Palo Alto experienced a mini-bubble on the tail end of the dot-com boom. Prices have now fallen to around where they were back in 2004, but only just below the maniacal glory days of Pets.com and WebVan. And, as foreclosures infiltrate these luxury markets, forced sales are becoming more common. This is beginning to drive down prices, as can be seen in the recent dip that picked up steam earlier in the year.

Luxury markets around the country have seen a similar trend in home prices: A later peak and less dramatic fall, but prices that are yet to be supported by opportunistic investors. But all is not bleak in other Palo Altos around the country.

These high-end markets have benefitted from the strong stock market of the past 9 months. If the economy can avoid another tumble and markets can remain resilient as the government gradually withdraws its stimulus, high end markets may find support sooner than many skeptics think.

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US Median Home Price 1965-2009
Gray area is “Inflation” period of 1972-1983, 201% total increase in home prices during that 12 year period, or 10.5% annually.
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Consumer Price Index 1965-2009
Gray area is “Inflation” period of 1972-1983, 147% total increase in CPI during that 12 year period, or 8.5% annually.
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CPI vs. Median Home Price 1972-1983
Close up of the gray area, home prices seemed to outpace inflation a bit during the peak inflation late ’70s early ’80s.
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CPI vs. Median Home Price (y/y change) 1972-1987
Extended the view a bit, on the way up Home Price change peaked before CPI (’72) and bottomed first as well (’80, ‘82). Home prices off to the races again in the mid-late ’80s.
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30-yr Fixed Mortgage rates vs. Median Home Price 1972-1987
Home price gains slowed as rates ramped, but even with 18% rates annual home price change only briefly declined.
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30-yr Fixed Mortgage Rates vs. Median Home Price 1972-1987
As shown above, high rates slowed down increases but declines did not last long and prices started going up again when they lowered rates.
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