This post first appeared on Minyanville.

After four years of searing pain, the US housing market is finally showing signs of life. And even as the causes and relative sustainability of this nascent “recovery” are being hotly debated, traditional buyers and investors alike are jumping into the market for homes with both feet.

It now appears that the biggest, baddest investor of them all, the one with infinitely deep pockets, is wading into the fray: Uncle Sam.

According to HousingWire, the US Department of Housing and Urban Development, or HUD, is giving state and local governments a total of $50 million to help deal with the onslaught of foreclosed homes, many of which lie vacant and blighted, ripe for vandalism, squatting, or worse. HUD has allocated chunks of cash to national development groups and local community organizations hoping to plug holes left by the private real estate investment market.

Funds are being distributed through the Neighborhood Stabilization Program which was established by former President George Bush in Economic Stimulus part one, which was then expanded by President Barack Obama earlier this year.

This investment directly into the real estate market highlights a new strategy in Washington’s fight against foreclosures, and one which is likely to grow in the coming years. That the federal government will increasingly be forced to take ownership — directly or indirectly through local organizations — is the subject of a recent piece I wrote on land banking for HousingWire, a mortgage and housing trade publication.

Land banks are publicly funded entities charged with taking ownership, rehabilitating, and putting back into use vacant or otherwise unwanted properties. The most well-known land bank in the country is run by Genesee County in Michigan, which is home to the woe begotten town of Flint.

Flint’s land banking initiatives began decades ago, as foreclosures and blight are not some new, post-housing bubble phenomenon. The program has gone a long way in providing Flint the chance at a future many of its Rust Belt neighbors can only dream of.

While as a loyal capitalist I loathe government meddling into the affairs of the private markets, to cry foul at bureaucrats for meddling in the housing market would redefine the old cliché of closing the barn door after the horses have left the barn. If taxpayer money is going to be heaped at our country’s ongoing housing nightmare, far better for it to go to community redevelopment than to the reckless inflation of the balance sheets, earnings, and salaries of the likes of JP Morgan Chase (JPM), Wells Fargo (WFC), Bank of America (BAC) and Citigroup (C).

Initiatives like the recent allocation of money from HUD down to the local level do not represent some silver bullet to fix our housing woes, but seek to address some of the harsh realities of what, for most, is a foreclosure epidemic that plays itself out on CNBC and flashy websites like RealtyTrac or Foreclosure Radar: It just doesn’t seem real.

But drive through Oakland, California, Cape Coral, Florida, or Detroit and foreclosures aren’t just another statistic that evidences our dire economic situation. Foreclosures destroy neighborhoods, rip apart families, and set back years of what were otherwise positive improvements in some of the country’s most impoverished communities.

Real estate investors are reticent to put money to work in many of these areas because the risks simply don’t justify the rewards. Banks ignore many of these homes, abandoning the fight against looters and squatters, leaving the problems up to local police who are then dragged away from their regular beats. This isn’t a situation that benefits anyone.

It is, however, one of the uses for taxpayer money that can be reasonably justified. The list of government programs about which that cannot be said is far, far too long to list — and growing.

$50 million doesn’t even approach a drop in the bucket compared to what has already been spent bailing out AIG (AIG), Fannie Mae (FNM), Freddie Mac (FRE), General Motors (GM), Chrysler, Bank of America, Citigroup, and countless other, smaller firms that only now exist because taxpayers ponied up our hard-earned cash, whether we wanted to or not.

This $50 million is only the beginning. Lurking beneath the headlines of what many believe to be a respite from the Great Recession are neighborhoods with no hope of a recovery. The land banks, indeed, cometh.

This post first appeared on Minyanville.

Freedom is back in vogue: Americans are finally growing tired of living in the shackles of debt.

According to the Wall Street Journal, government-led efforts to jumpstart lending are being derailed by weak demand for new loans. As the recession rolls on, an increasing percentage of consumers are opting to pay with cash or (gasp) save their hard-earned money.

Initiatives like the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) aim to free up consumer credit by supporting the market for asset-backed securities. The Federal Reserve and Treasury Department hope their efforts will enable American consumers to start spending again.

During the boom, fixed-income investors snatched up bonds backed by all types of debt – credit cards, auto loans, and, of course, mortgages. High demand for these seemingly safe investments pushed down interest rates, which stretched consumers’ budgets to the brink – and beyond.

But now that investors have been badly burned by such investments, they’re shying away from the market almost entirely. Without Wall Street’s securitization machine, there’s simply nowhere to put new consumer loans.

After years of gorging on cheap credit, Americans are reverting to more responsible fiscal lifestyles. Savings are up, spending is down – which is as it should be. This is reducing the urge to borrow and thwarting Washington’s plans to pass the bailout buck down to taxpayers.

Every dollar we don’t spend or don’t borrow is another that could potentially be handed over to effectively insolvent financial firms like Citigroup (C), Bank of America (BAC) and American International Group (AIG), or failed automakers like General Motors (GM) and Chrysler.

That task is growing increasingly dicey, as it becomes clear that using debt to fix a system already crippled by debt is patently absurd. And even as the US government loads up on borrowing, consumers are doing the right thing: getting out of hock.

By ANDREW JEFFERY

This post first appeared on Minyanville.

In its ongoing attempt to rewrite the rules of what’s quickly becoming our quasi-capitalist nation, the Obama Administration is weighing options that would expand compensation restrictions to all corners of the financial-services industry.

According to the New York Times, well-publicized efforts to rein in executive pay at firms that accepted TARP money could extend to companies that have thus far stayed off the government dole. In other words, the spottily regulated world of hedge funds and private equity could be subject to some of the same restrictions faced by their government-subsidized competitors.

However unpleasant, firms like Citigroup (C) and Bank of America (BAC) (both in hock to the US taxpayer for hundreds of billions of dollars) have lost their right to be the masters of their own executive compensation destiny. On the other hand, pay at hedge funds that haven’t touched a penny of government money should be determined by the firms themselves.

Since he took office, President Obama has been a loud advocate for pay that’s closely tied to performance. The prevailing view in Washington is that Wall Street traders were able to take on massive risk — either their firm’s or their clients’ — without feeling much pain if the bets went sideways. This led to excessive risk-taking, and the kind of near-criminal alchemy that ultimately blew up the financial lab.

And while this is true to an extent, the result of this typical government overreaction will be a system reduction of risk – and by extension, of reward. Financiers, entrepreneurs and businesspeople of all types engage in risky behavior every day – which is what keeps the economy humming.

Systematically reduce the incentive to take risks, and economic output will slow. It’s simple math.

Already, even as Washington bumbles its way towards legislation on executive pay, what’s left of the free market is sorting things out on its own.

Raising capital is well-nigh impossible for upstart hedge funds, as even management teams with strong credentials are struggling to get off the ground. Existing funds, most of which remain below their so-called “high-water mark” (the level at which juicy performance incentive fees kick in), won’t see big bonus payouts until well into 2010.

This is the market at work, punishing bad actors — even ones that were just marginally bad — and creating an environment where only the most astute, talented, and driven can succeed.

By contrast, as policymakers look to make up for years of ignoring their fiduciary responsibility to safeguard the public interest, we’re witnessing the development of an economic system that benefits only the most well-connected.

Needless to say, this is an unwelcome progression.

By ANDREW JEFFERY

This post first appeared on Minyanville.

Of the myriad highbrow economic debates currently raging throughout the world of punditry, academia and government policy, few are as contentious as the one over the future of prices: Inflation vs. Deflation.

Indeed, the endgame for this issue is not insignificant, as many believe our economic future hinges on the Federal Reserve’s ability to deftly engineer a return to steady, manageable inflation. To say the least, this is no easy task.

With the unemployment marching upwards, credit markets still largely frozen and global trade grinding to a halt, the American economy is in desperate need of a monetary jolt. The trouble for Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke is that with interest rates already at zero, he’s being forced to rely on so-called “quantitative easing” to pump money into our badly bruised financial system.

These efforts are being managed through the alphabet soup of new lending programs like TALF, TAF, CPFF and others.

Meanwhile, a glut of savings from the developing world coupled with reckless financial alchemy caused debt loads to skyrocket to unsustainable levels. The ongoing destruction of that debt, discussed often by Minyanville’s Kevin Depew and Mr. Practical, is now raging at full speed, as assets of all types have come screaming back to earth.

Bloomberg highlights the debate by focusing on 2 highly regarded economists with divergent views on inflation and its causes.

John Maynard Keynes, a 20th century British economist gained notoriety for his thesis that inflation was controlled by supply-demand fundamentals within an economy. He advanced the view that well-directed government spending could help a country balance economic growth with a moderate, healthy rise in prices.

Western politicians jumped on the Keynesian bandwagon during much of the last century to support a vast expansion in government spending and intrusion into the private sector.

Opposing Keynes was Milton Friedman, who instead believed that “inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.” Friedman’s focus on monetary policy, that is, interest rates and controlling the flow of money through a country’s economy, clashed with the Keynesian view that inflation could be controlled with fiscal measures and legislation.

Bernanke is doubling down on Keynes, evidenced by recent lending initiatives, bailouts of financial institutions like American International Group (AIG) and his support of President Barack Obama’s massive fiscal spending program. The Fed’s involvement in cleaning up the balance sheets of Citigroup (C) and Bank of America (BAC), along with efforts to jumpstart the mortgage market have also diminished its ability to remain apolitical and tend solely to the needs of the economy.

The Fed’s gamble is a bold one, as inflating our way out of a deflationary debt unwind could lead to a rapid, uncontrollable rise in prices should the economy rebound sooner than expected.

For example, big oil companies like Exxon Mobil (XOM) and Chevron (CVX) will be reticent to invest in new technologies or drill new wells should crude prices remain low. Limited production capacity could squeeze supply when demand picks back up, leading to a rise in prices.

This trend of firms retrenching in response to rapidly waning demand for goods is being mirrored throughout the economy. And although the Fed promises to take back the monetary stimulus when the economic growth returns, the timing and political implications of such a move are anything but a slam dunk.

And unlike other more esoteric debates over economic ideology, the result of the inflation vs. deflation slugfest has real implications for all Americans.

Inflation, while generally viewed as a necessary evil for economic growth, lines the pockets of those invested in financial and other economic assets at the expense of those on the lower rungs of the economic ladder. If real incomes rose at the same rate prices did since the Fed was created in 1913, they would currently stand at $300,000 per year, six times the current median household income of around $50,000.

In other words, Americans earn about 80% less, in real terms, than they did 100 years ago.

Deflation, while causing a drag on the economy at large, benefits those making less money as each additional dollar they earn stretches further. Meanwhile, at the top of the economic spectrum, the wealthy dislike deflation since their stocks, bonds, commodities, homes and Rolexes all fall in value.

As calls for a stock market bottom and impending economic recovery gain momentum, so too will predictions of rampant inflation. Ironically, Bernanke and fellow central bankers around the world are counting on the hangover from the financial crisis to be bad enough to forestall a resurgence in demand and enable them to slowly, carefully withdraw their monetary steroids.

Whether that will be possible, or even politically acceptable is anybody’s guess.

The month of March brought a degree of chaos to the financial markets, and indeed to the country as a whole, not seen in, well, months.

The stock market culminated another wave of selling with multi-decade lows, only to rebound in the strongest counter-trend rally since the bear market began last year. The AIG bonus scandal whipped the media, the public and Congress into a frenzy. General Motors lost its CEO at the hand of the President and we learned about Washington’s (latest) last ditch effort to save the financial system.

Meanwhile, the housing market gave investors and homeowners alike a ray of hope: A pop in February’s new and existing home sales. Optimistic pundits declared the housing market’s bottom just months away, while prices stubbornly maintained their distinctly southward trend.

Most economists use these broad trends to “predict” how far home prices will fall and when we’ll ultimately bottom. Data on the national level, however, just isn’t useful to most people. After all, whether you’re buying your first home or plunking down your savings on an investment property, the most important house is the one you’re buying, not some statistical collection of millions of unique properties.

This month’s Chart of the Month illustrates how thoughtful analysis can be used to identify trends the widely quoted data overlook. Prices for smaller homes on the Peninsula peaked first in late 2006 and have slid steadily ever since. Bigger houses, on the other hand, held up better but have fallen almost as far in half the time. This mirrors the trend that Prime mortgages are now souring faster than subprime.

In the coming months, we’ll be watching closely to see if any of these groupings bucks the prevailing trend — will the first group to crack be the first to bottom? Or will the high end’s fall be short and sweet?

By ANDREW JEFFERY

This post first appeared on Minyanville.

“If at first you don’t succeed, try, try again” – and you certainly can’t fault lawmakers for a lack of persistence in trying to stem the epidemic foreclosures plaguing America’s housing market.

Sadly, they insist on trying the same failed strategies over and over again.

For more than 18 months now, Congress has resolutely believed loan modifications are the path out of the housing jungle. But despite a blitzkrieg of public-relations campaigns and benevolent-sounding foreclosure-prevention programs like “Hope for Homeowners,” “HOPE NOW” and the latest, the Federal Reserve’s “Homeownership Preservation Policy,” modification efforts continue to sputter.

Even private-sector programs announced by big banks like Citigroup (C) and Bank of America (BAC) have had only marginal success.

After months of relentless pressure from the House and Senate alike, the Fed’s new policy allows it to review loans supporting the assets it purchased after it rescued Bear Stearns and AIG (AIG) for potential modifications. Barney Frank, the House Financial Services Committee Chairman, told reporters yesterday, “This is a very big deal.”

Actually, Mr. Frank, it’s not.

The assets acquired when the Fed and Treasury Department backed the JPMorgan (JPM) buyout of Bear Stearns and nationalized AIG were derivatives, not actual loans. These mortgage-backed securities are supported by thousands of individual mortgages, while the interest in those underlying loans was sliced up and allocated to countless securities, derivatives, and derivatives of derivatives.

Securities owners can’t modify mortgages: The rules about altering loan terms are pre-determined in securitization documents. It’s left up to loan servicers to implement the rules, whether the security owners like it or not.

Nevertheless, according to Bloomberg, the Fed — after identifying which loans it holds a fractional interest in — will encourage the servicers of those residential mortgage-backed securities “to implement a loan modification program that is consistent with this policy.”

Congress, Treasury and now the Fed have been trying to months now to get servicers on board with modification efforts, to no avail. Even the FDIC, whose highly touted modification program is being tried out at defunct California thrift IndyMac, has been unable to successfully – and sustainably — modify loans en masse.

The reason modification efforts aren’t working — amid evidence that Washington continues to ignore the root of the housing problem — is that the vast majority of loan defaults are being caused by job losses and negative equity. Borrowers can’t get a new loan without a job, nor can they qualify for a modification if they owe more on their house than it’s worth.

According to data released by JPMorgan yesterday, average equity for subprime loans stands at less than 5%.


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It’s negative for all Alt-A adjustable rate mortgages.



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Average equity in jumbo prime loans, which are experiencing defaults at faster rates than either subprime or Alt-A, has tumbled from 45% in January 2006 to less than 20% at the end of last year.


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And, even as regulators force mortgage rates down to record lows to encourage buyers to step in — catching the falling knife of tumbling home prices and risking financial ruin for the benefit of the rest of us — property values continue to fall.

Meanwhile, regulators and lawmakers continue to parade bold foreclosure-prevention efforts before the public. And they’ll keep trying – even if it bankrupts the country.

This post first appeared on Minyanville and our sister site Dawn Patrol.

The bailout is done! Time to breathe a sigh of relief.

Or is it?

As details emerge about the financial bailout package that was jammed through Congress over 10 days of political theater at its most nauseating, there’s still a striking omission from the plan to right American’s economic ship.

The failure of bureaucrats and regulators to propose a realistic solution for the foreclosure problem is emblematic of their inability to treat the root cause of an issue, focusing instead on simply applying band-aids to the visible symptoms.

The bailouts of Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae (FNM) and Freddie Mac (FRE), and AIG (AIG) all claimed to remove the cancer – but all they did was hasten the patient’s demise.

Treasury’s plan will deliver money into the banking system to sop up toxic assets sitting on the balance sheets of our financial institutions. This is a necessary — albeit unfortunate — step, but it still doesn’t address the root of the rot: Milions of homes are worth less than the outstanding balance of the owner’s mortgage.

Billions of dollars in negative equity are destroying Main Street’s balance sheet even as it devours Wall Street, eroding the value of the very securities Taxpayers are about to start buying.

As long as Washington tries to fight foreclosures with ineffective loan modification programs that simply prolong the problems, foreclosures will continue to set records. Modifying a mortgage for someone who is barely scraping by is sort of like rescuing him from the side of a cliff, only to leave him on the edge, dangling by one arm.

Foreclosures are often blamed for spiraling home prices and the resulting collapse in value of securities tied to the mortgages used to buy those houses. According to Bloomberg, the government’s aid package is designed to support “financial companies reeling from the record number of home foreclosures.”

Foreclosures don’t cause houses to lose their value. Foreclosures happen when a home loses value such that it’s worth less than the mortgage used to buy it, and the homeowner can’t sell or refinance if his interest payments become overwhelming.

Defaults become delinquencies, which become foreclosures, which become evictions, which become repossessions, which flood the market, depressing prices as supply outstrips demand.

Back in what seems like ancient history, when home prices only went up, banks weren’t too concerned with defaults, since homeowners could almost always sell themselves out of a problem. Foreclosures stayed low because the liquid, appreciating housing market bailed out troubled homeowners on its own. That’s part of the reason the industry is so ill-equipped to handle the scope of the current problem: it never had to before.

But now, with so many borrowers underwater — owing more on their house than it’s worth — defaults result in not only eventual liquidation of the property, but profound distress in the homeowner’s life and real losses for investors. Furthermore, delinquent borrowers are less inclined to pay for upkeep or security, and many foreclosed homes are seriously damaged by the time a bank is able to take possession of it.

Being underwater is debilitating. To sell, not only does a homeowner have to pay a Realtor 6% whether he gets a raw deal or not, but he has to pay the bank the difference between where his home sells and the outstanding balance of his loan.

For many who have seen the value of their homes fall hundreds of thousands of dollars, this is an impossibility. Most homeowners, once they’re upside down, just want to stay in their homes.

A more effective plan to curb foreclosures would require an independent reviewer to evaluate each delinquent mortgage, determine the borrower’s ability to pay going forward and the amount, if any, of negative equity that needs to be destroyed to bring the loan amount back under the home’s value.

Since the notion that buying Wall Street’s toxic assets will result in windfall profits is a willfully distributed fallacy aimed at getting the public on board for the bailout, Taxpayers would be well-served dumping money into a blender that’s at least in their own backyard.

British Prime Minister Gordon Brown recently proposed a similar plan, where the government will buy delinquent mortgages from banks for the outstanding balance of the loan. The home is then rented to the existing tenant or a new one and managed by a local housing association.

The government would absorb the difference between the loan amount and the resale value, which would hasten increase sales activity, clearing out the glut of homes listed too high for the simple reason that the owner can’t afford to sell at a lower price.

This type of personalized bailout, unfortunately, reeks of moral hazard. Many individuals who made bad financial decisions will get to keep their homes, albeit without actual ownership. But the current socialization of our free markets is simply moral hazard be design, so if Congress is so hell-bent on bailing out Wall Street, why not share the spoils with Main Street.

If Congress wants this bailout to help the American people and keep the financial system in tact, a sizable portion of the funds should be directed at fixing the asset that’s at the center of this turmoil: the residential property.

Home prices need to come down further. They will come down further. It’s only a matter of time. We can either let home prices bleed down, slowly eroding the value of the securities they support and violently uprooting families, or the government can plug the hole.

Washington Mutual (WM) is already off the field, as JP Morgan (JPM) continues to play widowmaker for the financial system. Wachovia (WB) isn’t likely to remain independent for long. The sooner the rebuilding process begins, the better.

This crisis, and the resulting ebb and flow of what remains of the free market has already tipped the scales, started us sliding down a path of deflation in everything from stock prices, to cereal boxes, soda bottles, not to mention homes.

This is a good development. The hardest lesson Americans will learn from this crisis, should learn from this crisis, is that sometimes it’s necessary to live within our means. There is virtue in simplicity. More is not always better. Bigger is not always better. Sometimes, amazingly enough, less is often better.

This progress is the only true way we’ll make it out of this mess.