By ANDREW JEFFERY

This post first appeared on Minyanville.

Looks like all those option adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) weren’t such a good idea after all: 1% teaser rates and loans that grow, rather than shrink, over time just aren’t meant for questionable borrowers buying overpriced homes.

Newport Beach-based Downey Savings (DSL), the fifth largest originator of option ARMs, was seized by federal regulators late Friday. The scraps were sold to US Bancorp (USB) for a song, which included almost $10 billion in deposits. Pomona First Federal, another Southern California lender highly levered to the real estate market, was also taken over by Minneapolis-based US Bank.

According to Bloomberg, the 2 failures will cost the FDIC more than $2 billion to clean up. US Bank agreed to assume the first $1.6 billion in losses from the banks’ loan portfolios, but anything above that will be split with the FDIC.

Each of the 5 biggest option ARM writers have now collapsed. Countrywide was purchased by Bank of America (BAC) in July; IndyMac collapsed into the arms of the FDIC just a few weeks later; Washington Mutual was scooped up by JP Morgan (JPM) in September; October saw Wells Fargo (WFC) best Citigroup (C) for the right to buy Wachovia (WB); now Downey is gone.

It didn’t have to end this way.

Traditionally meant for savvy borrowers capable of managing multiple payment options, Washington Mutual is often cited as having invented the option ARM in the early 80s.

The loan gives a borrower a series of payment choices, the lowest of which is so tiny the loan balance increases each month instead of being paid down. ARMs also typically include a teaser rate – sometimes as low as 1% – which can last anywhere from1 month to 5 years.

Ideal for real estate investors, salespeople with choppy income or families hopping between 1 and 2 earners, the flexible payment options and strict underwriting guidelines made option ARMs some of the best performing loans on the market.

But that was then.

As securitization took off, interest rates fell and the housing market heated up, lenders turned these once-safe loans into jet fuel for their ballooning mortgage businesses.

Option ARMs came to epitomize the irresponsible lending that ran rampant during the boom. Lenders abused their ability to qualify borrowers at absurdly low rates, jamming them into homes they could never afford once their mortgage payments rose.

Due to their complexity, mortgage brokers and loan officers rarely bothered to make sure borrowers fully understood the loan terms. A complete explanation would have lasted hours, providing adequate cover for the fraud already so prevalent in the business.

Banks loved option ARMs because accounting rules allowed them to book the fully indexed mortgage payment as income, even if the borrower made the minimum payment each month. That meant a juicy bottom line, even if cash barely trickled in the door.

Mortgage brokers and loan officers loved option ARMs because they could earn fat commissions on loans that were easy to sell – since they never had  to explain them.

And borrowers loved option ARMs because they could buy their dream homes, rationality be damned.

Option ARMs flourished in boom states like California, Florida, Arizona and Nevada since homeowners could simply sell or refinance their way out of any problems as home values kept rising. Delinquencies remained remarkably low, creating years of “historical” data upon which to base assumptions about future loan performance.

Back in New York, Bear Stearns pioneered Wall Street’s foray into Option ARMs. The mortgage gurus at Bear figured out how to turn them into highly profitable mortgage-backed securities.

After that, it was a race to the bottom. Bear, Countrywide and IndyMac literally competed for business based on who could buy the loans faster – and with less scrutiny.

When home prices stopped rising, however, it all came crashing down.

Faced with a rising loan balance, higher monthly payments as teaser periods ran out and falling property values, borrowers were stuck. Defaults rose, losses mounted and banks couldn’t unload the paper without taking significant hits. Instead, they chose to hold on and try to ride it out.

We now know how that strategy ended.

As I have written previously, in the face of unprecedented government intervention, the free market has still managed to punish the mortgage boom’s worst offenders. Not every guilty party will be brought to justice, but the firms that have failed thus far were deserving of their fate.

To be sure, not every employee at the likes of Bear, Lehman, Countrywide and Downey were culpable, but when the dust settles, the weak hands will have been truly cleaned out. Banks that maintained even marginally prudent lending standards are now reaping the benefits.

This fact gives me hope – hope that despite their best efforts, bureaucrats will always lose in their battle against the free market.

This post first appeared on Minyanville and our sister site Dawn Patrol.

The bailout is done! Time to breathe a sigh of relief.

Or is it?

As details emerge about the financial bailout package that was jammed through Congress over 10 days of political theater at its most nauseating, there’s still a striking omission from the plan to right American’s economic ship.

The failure of bureaucrats and regulators to propose a realistic solution for the foreclosure problem is emblematic of their inability to treat the root cause of an issue, focusing instead on simply applying band-aids to the visible symptoms.

The bailouts of Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae (FNM) and Freddie Mac (FRE), and AIG (AIG) all claimed to remove the cancer – but all they did was hasten the patient’s demise.

Treasury’s plan will deliver money into the banking system to sop up toxic assets sitting on the balance sheets of our financial institutions. This is a necessary — albeit unfortunate — step, but it still doesn’t address the root of the rot: Milions of homes are worth less than the outstanding balance of the owner’s mortgage.

Billions of dollars in negative equity are destroying Main Street’s balance sheet even as it devours Wall Street, eroding the value of the very securities Taxpayers are about to start buying.

As long as Washington tries to fight foreclosures with ineffective loan modification programs that simply prolong the problems, foreclosures will continue to set records. Modifying a mortgage for someone who is barely scraping by is sort of like rescuing him from the side of a cliff, only to leave him on the edge, dangling by one arm.

Foreclosures are often blamed for spiraling home prices and the resulting collapse in value of securities tied to the mortgages used to buy those houses. According to Bloomberg, the government’s aid package is designed to support “financial companies reeling from the record number of home foreclosures.”

Foreclosures don’t cause houses to lose their value. Foreclosures happen when a home loses value such that it’s worth less than the mortgage used to buy it, and the homeowner can’t sell or refinance if his interest payments become overwhelming.

Defaults become delinquencies, which become foreclosures, which become evictions, which become repossessions, which flood the market, depressing prices as supply outstrips demand.

Back in what seems like ancient history, when home prices only went up, banks weren’t too concerned with defaults, since homeowners could almost always sell themselves out of a problem. Foreclosures stayed low because the liquid, appreciating housing market bailed out troubled homeowners on its own. That’s part of the reason the industry is so ill-equipped to handle the scope of the current problem: it never had to before.

But now, with so many borrowers underwater — owing more on their house than it’s worth — defaults result in not only eventual liquidation of the property, but profound distress in the homeowner’s life and real losses for investors. Furthermore, delinquent borrowers are less inclined to pay for upkeep or security, and many foreclosed homes are seriously damaged by the time a bank is able to take possession of it.

Being underwater is debilitating. To sell, not only does a homeowner have to pay a Realtor 6% whether he gets a raw deal or not, but he has to pay the bank the difference between where his home sells and the outstanding balance of his loan.

For many who have seen the value of their homes fall hundreds of thousands of dollars, this is an impossibility. Most homeowners, once they’re upside down, just want to stay in their homes.

A more effective plan to curb foreclosures would require an independent reviewer to evaluate each delinquent mortgage, determine the borrower’s ability to pay going forward and the amount, if any, of negative equity that needs to be destroyed to bring the loan amount back under the home’s value.

Since the notion that buying Wall Street’s toxic assets will result in windfall profits is a willfully distributed fallacy aimed at getting the public on board for the bailout, Taxpayers would be well-served dumping money into a blender that’s at least in their own backyard.

British Prime Minister Gordon Brown recently proposed a similar plan, where the government will buy delinquent mortgages from banks for the outstanding balance of the loan. The home is then rented to the existing tenant or a new one and managed by a local housing association.

The government would absorb the difference between the loan amount and the resale value, which would hasten increase sales activity, clearing out the glut of homes listed too high for the simple reason that the owner can’t afford to sell at a lower price.

This type of personalized bailout, unfortunately, reeks of moral hazard. Many individuals who made bad financial decisions will get to keep their homes, albeit without actual ownership. But the current socialization of our free markets is simply moral hazard be design, so if Congress is so hell-bent on bailing out Wall Street, why not share the spoils with Main Street.

If Congress wants this bailout to help the American people and keep the financial system in tact, a sizable portion of the funds should be directed at fixing the asset that’s at the center of this turmoil: the residential property.

Home prices need to come down further. They will come down further. It’s only a matter of time. We can either let home prices bleed down, slowly eroding the value of the securities they support and violently uprooting families, or the government can plug the hole.

Washington Mutual (WM) is already off the field, as JP Morgan (JPM) continues to play widowmaker for the financial system. Wachovia (WB) isn’t likely to remain independent for long. The sooner the rebuilding process begins, the better.

This crisis, and the resulting ebb and flow of what remains of the free market has already tipped the scales, started us sliding down a path of deflation in everything from stock prices, to cereal boxes, soda bottles, not to mention homes.

This is a good development. The hardest lesson Americans will learn from this crisis, should learn from this crisis, is that sometimes it’s necessary to live within our means. There is virtue in simplicity. More is not always better. Bigger is not always better. Sometimes, amazingly enough, less is often better.

This progress is the only true way we’ll make it out of this mess.

This post first appeared on Minyanville and our sister site, Dawn Patrol.

Every once in a while, the most important news story of the day is the one the Wall Street Journal allots a mere 200 words.

In a move that will soon be greeted with quiet mutterings of “I should have seen this coming,” British Prime Minister Gordon Blair announced today a shift in the focus of initiatives aimed at reviving the ailing housing industry, and by extension the rest of the economy.

Until this point, much of the government-directed efforts to fix broken housing markets — both here and abroad — have focused on the mortgage side of housing transactions.

This should come as no surprise, as Wall Street banks like Goldman Sachs (GS), Merrill Lynch (MER), Lehman Brothers (LEH) and Bear Stearns — er, JPMorgan (JPM) — had staked their reputations — and balance sheets — on those mortgages.

Foreclosure prevention has attempted to preserve the integrity of the loan by extending its ability to keep generating cash for the lender. If a family or 2 were helped in the process, all the better. But with trillions of dollars in securities propping up the world’s financial system based on unreliable monthly payments from struggling American consumers, the mortgage was saved in favor of the property itself or its inhabitants.

HOPE NOW and Project Lifeline have been our bureaucrats’ best effort at leeping people from being kicked out of their homes. Anecdotally and by the numbers, the results have been less than awe-inspiring.

As part of a larger economic reform package, Brown is taking a decidedly different approach. Any homeowner behind on his mortgage and facing the risk of repossession will have his situation evaluated by a “money advisor,” who, according to the Guardian, will determine whether nor not the loan is worth salvaging.

If this guru of the economically unfeasible gives the thumbs-down, the borrower gets a rescue package; the government gets the house. A housing association or other publicly funded group can then lease the property back to for the former homeowner or otherwise rehab the property for new tenants.

The lender can either be made whole or can retain some of the risk (and therefore potential return) in the property, staying in the game a bit longer.

This focus on the raw asset — the house — rather than on a flimsy deed of trust represents a step in the right direction in the “war on foreclosures.” The mere fact that Washington (and London) are dipping their tentacles this deep into housing markets should rightly disturb anyone with even half-hearted capitalistic ideals – but some government plans are better than others.

The problem with mortgage-focused foreclosure prevention is that it prolongs a borrower’s agony by keeping him in a loan he or she should never have taken out in the first place. The house itself bears the brunt of this strategy’s shortcomings, since homeowners forgo maintenance, landscaping, trash removal and other value-preserving services to survive another month.

By stepping in and taking control of the property before the copper pipes can be ripped out and the repossession process can further erode the home’s resale value, the plan could slow some of the economic hardship and community decay caused by abandoned, vandalized homes.

Although the business of buying and selling distressed mortgage assets — including bank-owned homes — is hacking its way through the world of troubled properties, the scale of the problem and the challenging nature of the transaction itself mean that the crisis will take years to work through.

If the government is going to use taxpayer dollars to try to get us out of this mess, land banks and direct funds for rebuilding communities isn’t a terrible place to start.

It sure beats bailing out Wall Street.