This post first appeared on Minyanville.

Despite the best efforts of the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department, the free market is winning the battle over mortgage rates. Tens of trillions of dollars in support for the financial system can’t change the stark reality: Giving out home loans remains risky business.

Borrowers looking to take advantage of rock-bottom interest rates are seeing the opportunity slip through their fingers, as rates have risen by more than 0.50% in the past few weeks.

According to the Wall Street Journal, the pop in rates is due to expectations of economic recovery, combined with fears that the mounting pile of debt incurred by Washington’s central economic planners may not be sustainable. As the government prints money and plunges the country into an ever-deeper deficit, holders of US Treasuries (e.g. China) are getting skittish. These investors are quietly demanding a higher return on their bet that our economy will pull out of its current tailspin.

This, in turn, is pushing up mortgage rates, which doesn’t bode well for nascent signs of recovery. Big lenders like Wells Fargo (WFC), Bank of America (BAC) and JPMorgan Chase (JPM) — despite offloading nearly all default risk to taxpayers via Fannie Mae (FNM), Freddie Mac (FRE), or the Federal Housing Administration — are asking prospective borrowers to pony up hefty points up front to get the lowest rate possible.

And this at a time when pundits and performance-chasing portfolio managers are latching onto the absurd notion that the nation’s housing market is making some sort of fundamentally sound turnaround. A contributor to CNBC actually said with a straight face that our economy can’t grow with mortgage rates this “high,” and that the Fed is derailing the recovery by letting rates move up.

To say that our economy is undergoing some sort of legitimate recovery, and at the same time assert mortgage rates a hair above 5% are too high is to confirm that those declaring the recession in our rear view mirror are delusional at best, talking their book at worst.

As renewed fears of inflation percolate and investors begin to snatch up commodities in expectation of future prices, pressure will mount on the Fed to keep rates of all kinds low to ensure the economy doesn’t remain mired in its current malaise. This means more printing press activity, more “quantitative” easing, and more social-welfare programs packaged as “progressive” economic policy.

Battle lines are being drawn: Washington bureaucrats on one side, advancing the theory that money can be printed seemingly without limit to generate legitimate economic growth – and the market on the other. And each time the Fed takes its foot off the dollar-debasement accelerator, we get a peek into what will happen when the printing presses finally run out of ink.

By ANDREW JEFFERY

This post first appeared on Minyanville.

With mortgage rates at historic lows, housing prices plummeting, and Washington throwing billions at housing-market recovery efforts, why is it still so damn hard to get a loan?

And while the easy answer is that banks are flat-out broke, the real answer may lie in an esoteric corner of mortgage finance which has all but disappeared: warehouse lending.

In the heyday of the housing boom, small mortgage companies were able to compete with huge financial institutions by tapping so-called warehouse lines of credit. Using cash from their warehouse lender to fund loans at the closing table, as big banks do, these smaller mortgage shops could often provide better service than their bigger competitors, though at the same low rates.

Warehouse lenders, often big banks themselves — remember Washington Mutual and Countrywide (Bank of America (BAC))? — held onto loans until they were sold in the secondary market. Turnaround time could be anywhere from a few days to a few months for larger, more complex transactions.

The benefits to being able to finance one’s own loans rather than just acting as a broker were numerous. Having a warehouse line gave mortgage bankers better control over the closing process, enabling them to beat out big banks in terms of response time and customer service.

By aggregating loans on a warehouse line, bankers could bundle them together and sell packages at a premium, rather than selling them off one by one. And since they could sell loans to any bank on the street, most such originators offered loan programs just as varied as those of even the biggest institutional lenders.

At the height of the boom, it was estimated that almost half of the over $3 trillion in annual loan production was first funded on a warehouse line.

As the mortgage market began to collapse, big purchasers stopped buying, and warehouse lines filled up with unwanted loans. Warehouse lenders began margin-calling clients, cutting off funding capacities, and capturing every penny they could from the few sales that actually went through.

The result, which can be plainly seen on websites like The Mortgage Lender Implode-o-Meter, was that hundreds of small bankers closed up shop.

Now, as banks scramble to handle the flood of requests for refinances at super-low interest rates, the mortgage industry is once again facing a credit crunch. By one estimate there’s only $25 billion in available warehouse lines to support the $2.8 trillion in mortgages expected to be written next year.

Mortgage bankers I speak with say the only thing holding them back from giving out more loans is a lack of warehouse capacity.

According to the Wall Street Journal, one solution being floated by the Mortgage Bankers Association (or MBA) is for Fannie Mae (FNM) and Freddie Mac (FRE) to provide government-backed warehouse lines to the few intrepid mortgage bankers still eking out a living in this nightmarish market.

The MBA argues that, since big banks like JPMorgan (JPM), Citigroup (C) and Wells Fargo (WFC) don’t need access to warehouse lines, they’re pushing out the smaller guys and stymieing competition. There’s little incentive for a Chase or a Citi to reopen its warehouse lending group, since the move would just allow competitors to grab market share from the very profitable business of originating loans.

While it makes logical sense for regulators to allow Fannie and Freddie to prop up this segment of the market, it may run contrary to other bank-friendly initiatives. Fees generated by writing new mortgages may be the only thing keeping the likes of Bank of America and Citigroup from tapping even more government support to stay afloat.

This post first appeared on Minyanville.

It’s starting to make economic sense to go green.

Last summer, with gas prices topping $4 per gallon and commodities of all kinds becoming more expensive, renewable energy advocates thought their day in sun — so to speak — had finally arrived.

Investors flocked to industry leaders like First Solar (FSLR) and SunPower (SPWRA), whose stocks leapt to new highs. On July 8, 2008, renowned investor T. Boone Pickens announced an ambitious plan to wean America off its dependence on foreign oil. Later that week, crude touched an all-time high of $147.02 per barrel.

Since then, oil — along the rest of the commodity complex — has plunged, dashing hopes that renewable energy would soon be as cheap, if not cheaper, than traditional, dirty fossil fuels. But now, with the economy in free fall and Washington scrambling to boost productivity, renewable energy has been taken off life support.

Part of the recently passed $797 billion economic stimulus package gives incentives to homeowners to adopt energy-saving appliances, solar panels and other eco-friendly add-ons. Increased tax credits for qualifying expenditures can reduce tax bills by thousands of dollars a year. The catch (and there’s always a catch when the government is involved): Benefits only arrive if you shell out big bucks for pricey green gear.

Tax credits are applicable on new expenditures, and since solar-panel systems run in the tens of thousands of dollars, the 30% tax credit isn’t exactly like socking money away in the bank. Still, green construction firms and solar panel installation outfits like Akeena Solar (AKNS) are eager snatch up new business.

Before the credit crunch and the ensuing financial meltdown, Akeena had actually partnered with Comerica Bank (CMA) to offer low interest loans for buyers of new solar-energy systems, a portion of which could be backed by the value of the home. Since monthly loan payments were easier to stomach than plunking down cash to buy a new system, these new lending programs could have made solar available to the masses.

But now that home values have plummeted and lenders are reticent to part with their precious dollars, such borrowing programs are nearly impossible to find. Still, for those homeowners intrepid enough to take the plunge, tax credits offer an attractive reason to get off the green fence.

While solar power isn’t as economically efficient as traditional electricity sources, the more money that’s pumped into new technologies — even if it’s through a combination of private and public investment — the sooner we’re likely to reach the parity solar advocates have been promising for decades.

And the sooner that happens, the better.

By ANDREW JEFFERY

This post first appeared on Minyanville.

Washington just doesn’t get it: We don’t want more debt.

While congressmen berating bank CEOs for their unwillingness to lend out their bailout money makes for a nice media clip, it reflects the growing disconnect between our elected officials and any semblance of reality. Not that the relationship was ever particularly close – but lawmakers are floundering for good press while the nation’s economic future slips further and further from their tenuous grasp.

Bloomberg reports American consumers are wary of taking on more debt, as expectations about eroding economic conditions are forcing people, to *gasp* make responsible decisions about their personal finances.

Bloomberg cites Midsouth Bancorp (MSL) president C.R “Rusty” Cloutier, who says that, despite aggressive marketing, town hall meetings, and $20 million in TARP money, Midsouth’s customers just aren’t taking out new loans.

This is the rejection of debt Professor Depew speaks of when discussing the structural deflation we’re currently experiencing.

Credit is based on trust. And while conventionally we view this relationship as one in which the lender must trust the borrower to repay his debt — at least to an extent that’s commensurate with the interest rate — it does go both ways.

As lenders like Citigroup (C), Bank of America (BAC) and Wells Fargo (WFC) are increasingly being painted as corporate marauders out to rape and pillage the American public, would-be borrowers are wary of putting their financial future in the hands of these men of questionable repute. And with credit-card companies rushing to alter terms, it’s no surprise consumers are reluctant to extend themselves further.

Still, lawmakers are pushing through an economic stimulus package that depends, in part, on a willingness on the part of consumers to keep spending. Their delusion is only outmatched by their hubris – the belief that a bunch of self-interested politicos can coerce the average American into making ruinous financial decisions for the betterment of the country.

Floundering industries — notably automakers and homebuilders — are counting on government subsidies to encourage Americans to keep borrowing to buy their products. But what General Motors (GM), Ford (F), Centex (CTX) and KB Homes (KBH) don’t understand is this: We just don’t want what they’re peddling. And we certainly don’t want to borrow against it.

The transition from a debt-dependent, credit-drunk consumerist society won’t be immediate: It’s taken 18 months of financial panic for evidence of the shifting social mood to make its way into the mainstream.

But as the economic outlook continues to darken, the country becomes more disenfranchised, and the government grows ever-more addicted to sound bites and empty promises, reality will set in.

For the past 20 years, we’ve been blithely driving along an economic road that ends in a cliff. And that cliff is now in our rear-view mirror. We’re tumbling, groping for any branch that can save us from the fall. But each one of these new government programs, bailouts and rescues simply tries to set us gently back on the road from which we only just plummeted.

We already know where that path ends, and it ain’t pretty. What say we try another road?

This post first appeared on Minyanville.

As the debate rages about whether or not we’re finally approaching a floor in home prices, let’s examine the value of another asset: The mortgage.

When considering a home-buying transaction, buyers (and sellers) typically worry most about the value of the house. Lenders, on the other hand, are much more concerned with the value of the mortgage.

From a lender’s perspective, the economic value of a loan is its expected future cash flow in the form of interest payments. The key word in that phrase – and why a loan’s value isn’t purely derived from its rate – is “expected.”

To a bank, a loan is just a product, like an iPod is to Apple or a BlackBerry is to Research in Motion. The value of that product is just how much someone will pay for it. Loans with higher coupons, adjusting for risk, are worth more than those with lower coupons, because they fetch more on the open market.

Mortgages, or debt of any kind, are priced relative to their face value, or “par.” A $100,000 mortgage that’s worth par would cost $100,000. Prices are then expressed as a percentage of par. That is, a loan with a face value of $100,000 that’s worth 102.50 (percent) would cost $102,500.

Subprime loans are often considered “bad,” while prime loans are presumed to be “good.” Many assume, therefore, that high-quality prime loans are worth more than those lousy subprime ones. This isn’t entirely accurate.

“Good” loans are the ones where you’re appropriately paid for your risk, whereas “bad” ones are those in which you’re on taking too much risk relative to return. As Professor Sedacca often says, “If you aren’t being paid to take risk, don’t take risk.”

Consider the following 2 mortgage situations, ask yourself which one a lender is likely to value more highly:

Borrower A has impeccable credit, can make a sizable 30% down payment on her family’s first home, but will have to stretch to make the monthly payments because her husband just quit his job to stay home with their second child. The mortgage carries a low 6.00% rate, or coupon, because of Borrower A’s good credit and the low loan-to-value ratio (loan amount divided by sales price).

Borrower B has poor credit, stemming from medical problems that put him out of work for the past 12 months. Credit-card bills piled up, payments were missed and he had a hard time making ends meet. Healthy now, Borrower B is looking to refinance his existing mortgage on the home he’s lived in for 20 years. He needs some extra cash to finish paying off bills and get back on track, so he’s looking for a loan to value of 90%. The mortgage carries a high 9% coupon because of Borrower B’s bad credit and the loan’s high loan-to-value ratio.

I designed the examples to prove a point, but I would take Borrower B’s “subprime” mortgage over Borrower A’s every time. Even though Borrower A’s perceived risk (by the numbers) is less than Borrower B, Borrower A is probably more likely to default. Despite Borrower’s A big down payment, the low coupon may not cover the additional default risk.

Banks often write mortgages with the intent to sell them on the open market. Whether the loan is sold individually or packaged in a security, the higher the coupon, the higher the potential value for the ultimate owner (provided, of course, the risks are properly measured and evaluated).

Mortgage originators (both banks and brokers) and Wall Street firms used this concept to push bad loans onto borrowers. Whether Goldman Sachs (GS) wanted to issue a mortgage-backed security or Wells Fargo (WFC) planned to park the loan on its balance sheet, both earned more from higher coupon loans, so that’s what they asked for from their salespeople and brokers.

One of the most highly sought-after types of mortgages were those with a high loan-to-value ratio, written for speculative investment properties where borrowers didn’t have to state their income. These loans carried a very high coupon because of the high perceived risk of default.

However, since homeowners in areas experiencing rapid appreciation like Phoenix, Las Vegas, Florida and California could easily sell their way out of a problem during the boom, the actual risk on these loans remained low. Wall Street demanded precisely this kind of loan, and brokers wrote them. Whether the borrower could really afford the payments didn’t matter, since they could just sell the house at the first sign of trouble.

Of course, when appreciation stalled, actual risk shot up, and even high rates didn’t compensate banks for the risk these loans now carried.

Since Wall Street could earn far more packaging and securitizing these high-risk loans than they could on boring, low-coupon prime loans, they paid mortgage brokers and bankers higher commissions to write them. These originators, being good salespeople, aggressively marketed these loans to borrowers that fit these highly profitable criteria.

Homeowners, watching their neighbors get rich speculating on condos in Miami, had little to no financial incentive not to join in. That’s not to say there weren’t some who made responsible decisions - but enough people got caught up in the mania that, well, we are where we are right now.

So this brings us back to your mortgage. How much is it worth?

Remember to think about it from the bank’s perspective.

The next time you hear offers like “no closing costs!” or “low introductory rate!”, think about why the bank would do this. If it’s not charging fees to close the loan, you can be sure it’s making up that lost income with a higher rate. If it’s offering a teaser rate, the higher payments you’ll be making when the coupon adjusts upwards will more than make up for that low payment in the first few months.

The best way to get the best deal is to think about what loan will be worth the least to your lender. Low rate, low fees, low risk… Who wants that boring paper?

The answer: You do.

This post first appeared on Minyanville.

For anyone wondering where the billions of dollars in worthless mortgage-backed securities will wind up, look no further: The mirror.

Fannie Mae (FNM) and Freddie Mac (FRE), the formerly quasi-public, now taxpayer-owned mortgage behemoths, are stealthily sopping up the worst of the structured mortgage debt Wall Street churned out during the boom.

In a story that barely made the back pages of the nation’s newspapers, Bloomberg reports Fannie and Freddie will start purchasing $40 billion per month of “underperforming mortgage bonds.” For its part, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, which oversees the two firms, issued a statement saying it hasn’t set a specific dollar target for the initiative.

If this program is indicative of the care with which Washington plans to deploy taxpayer money to clean up the mortgage mess, we’re going to need a lot more than $700 billion.

In September, Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson rationalized the seizure of Fannie and Freddie by saying, “It’s very possible for not only the taxpayer not to be hurt or to make money, but for the shareholders to have some value restored to them.” It’s unclear how targeting the worst quality assets on the market will achieve this end.

The initiative — which is outside the scope of the recently announced bailout plan — intends to bring liquidity to the frozen mortgage markets. Regulators hope the effect will be lower rates on new mortgages, softening the blow of tumbling home prices.

Policy-makers are desperate to find ways to make buying a house easier, as banks continue to tighten lending requirements to shield themselves from further losses. From big banks like JPMorgan Chase (JPM) and Wells Fargo (WFC) to small, regional players like Gateway Bank in San Francisco, lenders are making it harder to take out mortgages, auto loans, credit cards and just about every other type of consumer debt.

The inevitable regulatory reaction in the coming years is likely to make getting a mortgage even harder.

Coupled with the growing belief in Washington that freezing the foreclosure process is necessary to stem the tide of repossessions decimating communities across the country, mortgage rates aren’t likely to fall any time soon.

The former Goldman Sachs employees — err, the federal government — have decided to bail out Fannie and Freddie and the race to call another bottom in equities, not to mention housing, is on.

Reality, however, is not a friend of these hopeful bulls.

Let’s take a quick scan of the economic landscape and see what issues the latest bailout has solved.

• - The unemployment rate seems to only be going up, and unless the new federal agency charged with keeping tabs on the two mortgage giants is hiring en masse, there won’t be much of a change here.
• - The dollar could see its recent rally erased after our trading partners and investors around the world come to terms with the $200 billion the Treasury department just dumped into the blender to cut 50 bps off mortgage rates. And, take note, those are prime, Agency rates, and that’s it.
• - The unfortunate reality is that most Americans are still in debt and cannot afford a down payment on a house, a requirement that’s yet to be removed.
• - Gas prices have fallen, but not by as much as crude prices. Hurricane season is alive and well, threatening most of the gulf oil rigs. Oil companies are already under pressure from tumultuous markets for their black gold and are not likely inclined to lower prices further.

As painful as it is to admit, Fannie and Freddie probably needed to be bailed out to keep the entire financial market from collapsing but it doesn’t mean we are at “the bottom.”

It takes awhile for a fundamental shift in lending to play its way out and that is what we are in the middle of. The middle class is being squeezed more than ever and consumer credit quality on the whole is not going to start improving tomorrow.

More important than any of these points is we do not know what our friends at the government are going to do with Fannie and Fredie and how long it is going to take them to do it. In fact, trusting the very folks who ran these companies into the ground — albeit under different leadership — to turn them around is hardly a comforting proposition.

In the end, we need to remember that you need a good credit score and a down payment to buy a house in the real world. So no matter what a television analyst on TV who makes $500,000 a year tells you, this credit crisis is far from over.

In further evidence of the ongoing credit contraction, Mortgagedaily.com reports Lehman Brothers is shuttering its Small Business Finance unit. The division made small commercial mortgage loans to individuals and corporations. The closure is the latest in Lehman’s efforts to shrink its mortgage business and reduce exposure to the US housing market.

Lenders everywhere are reducing access to credit, even as struggling consumers need it most to make ends meet. As banks and other financial companies delever, credit-dependent Americans will find it harder and harder to maintain their spend-happy ways.