This post first appeared in the November edition of Cirios Trends: Getting to the Bottom of the Housing Market

Of the myriad debates ongoing at a time when economics and
politics are seemingly two heads of the same freakish snake, the role government should play in directing economic actions dominates an already ideologically charged arena.

And nowhere is the issue argued more hotly than in the trenches of the housing market.

Government, some say, should come to the rescue of Main Street, vindicating the evils of Wall Street greed and excess run amok. Who else will look out for the little guy if not our elected representatives?

Others disagree, fingering Washington as one of the primary culprits in an economic landscape characterized by artificially low interest rates, lax regulation and a political class that was in bed with the corporations it claimed to be policing.

In housing, it’s no secret that government involvement in the market has reached new heights. Virtually every mortgage written today is backed by some branch of the federal government, be it via the FHA, Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. Tax credits to first time buyers spurred a flurry of purchase transactions this summer and fall, and inventory levels have been kept low by ongoing foreclosure moratoria.

Interest rates remain stubbornly low, despite fears of inflation and a collapsing US currency.

As a result, in some of the hardest hit real estate markets, prices seem to have stabilized, as supply has dropped to, in some cases, less than a month of inventory.

At the heart of the debate, and a point which is widely under-reported in the mainstream press, is the effect of decades of aggressive policies aimed at encouraging lower income Americans to buy homes.

These directives created a deeply liquid and profitable arena into which Wall Street moved, seized upon, and ultimately cannibalized. That Congress is now actively leading a witch hunt to track down the “guilty” is highly ironic since only with the implicit blessing of Washington could Wall Street have committed its crimes.

Look at the graph in the top right corner of this page. Taxpayers are increasingly being asked to cover losses which Washington is unloading from the private sector onto the public balance sheet. This liability will be a drag on the economy for years to come.

One unfortunate result of this crisis is that Americans with less than ideal credit are seeing access to banking services stripped away at an alarming rate. And while justified in some cases, there is a place in our economy for non-prime lending, if done right.

As big banks withdraw from this arena, smarting from losses of a similar shape to the graph above, small, niche lenders can step in and fill the void. Opportunities abound, if you just know where to look.

By ANDREW JEFFERY

This post first appeared on Minyanville.

Every month, it seems, Washington dreams up new and fantastic ways to funnel taxpayer money towards a growing list of undeserving recipients.

Now, in the latest attempt to coerce banks into modifying delinquent mortgages en masse, the Treasury Department plans to offer cash incentives to lenders who lower interest rates or forgive principal on second liens (so-called “piggyback” loans). According to Bloomberg, the new program aims to simplify the modification process and help struggling borrowers avoid foreclosure.

The subprime second lien was a highly profitable, nearly usurious loan product that proliferated during the housing boom. Once reserved for high-quality borrowers and those with sufficient equity in their homes, seconds became an easy way to jam borrowers into homes they couldn’t otherwise afford.

If a homeowner wants to take out a first mortgage for more than 80% of the home’s value, he or she is typically required to take out mortgage insurance, issued by firms like Radian (RDN), MGIC Investment Corp (MTG) and the PMI Group (PMI). For years, the cost of insurance — plus the required down payment — limited home ownership to those who, by and large, could afford to buy responsibly.

But as housing demand ballooned from 2002 to 2005, banks discovered they could just loan borrowers the down-payment money - and charge a hefty fee to do so. Without those pesky requirements — and by bypassing the sometimes strict credit guidelines of mortgage insurers — banks were able to open up their loan products to a whole new group of unqualified borrowers.

Second liens, by virtue of being subordinate to first liens, carry additional risk, and thus a higher interest rate. In other words, if a borrower defaults, the holder of the second lien has to wait until the first mortgage holder is made whole before getting paid.

And since seconds carried super-high interest rates, securities backed by this type of loan offered juicy returns for investors. It should come as no surprise that the second-lien market was dominated by Bear Stearns (now JPMorgan (JPM)), Countrywide (now Bank of America (BAC)), and Citigroup (C) (now in hock to Uncle Sam for a cool $300 million).

Now, the Obama Administration wants to give billions to not only the banks who wrote these loans, but the borrowers who accepted them. The program is destined for failure.

In fact, it’s already failed.

A little over a year ago, Fannie Mae (FNM) and Freddie Mac (FRE) introduced an initiative called the “HomeSaver Advance.” Under the program, borrowers behind on their mortgage payments could take out an unsecured line of credit to get current. Under this program, Fannie and Freddie lent out $462 million over the course of the next 12 months.

Now, based on current market prices, the loans are worth a whopping $8 million, or $0.017 cents on the dollar. Talk about throwing good money after bad.

The President’s initiative to modify seconds is no different: It takes a situation destined for foreclosure and simply prolongs the agony. This prevents the borrower from getting out from under his mountain of debt and starting anew. Meanwhile, homes become ever more dilapidated, and banks further delay their own days of reckoning.

The rationale for this program is obscure - though it does provide yet another way to hand taxpayer money over to the very banks who got us into this mess in the first place.

By ANDREW JEFFERY

This post first appeared on Minyanville.

For almost 2 years, we’ve been told government-backed loan modification efforts and foreclosure moratoriums would help ease the pain of the ongoing housing crisis. It’s not working.

Despite recent calls to the contrary — this morning’s came courtesy of real-estate mogul Sam Zell — residential home prices are still in free fall, and the bottom will remain elusive.

Picking up a trend noted weeks ago by housing blogs and other real-estate analysts, the Wall Street Journal reports banks and mortgage-servicing companies are pushing through foreclosures at the fastest rate in more than a year.

JPMorgan Chase (JPM), Citigroup (C) and Wells Fargo (WFC), 3 of the country’s biggest loan servicers, scaled back foreclosure efforts in recent months at the request of the Obama Administration. Now, with the bans lifted, a new wave of repossessions are simply a matter of time. In California, notices of default and trustee sale, which precede foreclosures, spiked in March as moratoriums expired and lenders returned to “business as usual.”

Banks, especially those collecting payments on behalf of Fannie Mae (FNM) and Freddie Mac (FRE), say they’re doing everything they can to keep borrowers in their homes. But according to GMAC (GM), as few as 10% of struggling homeowners qualify for the Obama Administration’s highly touted foreclosure prevention program.

The logical conclusion is that this new wave of bank owned homes being dumped onto the market will put even more downward pressure on housing prices. And while this is true on a localized, market by market level, widely monitored home price indicators may not tell the whole story.

As noted by the Field Check Group, a real-estate analysis firm, delinquencies on jumbo loans are rising at an alarming rate. This is consistent with trends we have been seeing over the past 6-9 months as prime defaults are now rising faster than subprime.

Currently, low-end, inexpensive homes dominate sales data, dragging down median and average prices. Foreclosures, however, are creeping into high-end markets, and coupled with high levels of inventory and weak demand, prices are tumbling. As forced sales become more prevalent and transactions rise in these well-to-do areas, expensive home sales will begin to represent a larger portion of transactions used in broad measures of prices.

In the coming months, we could see home price measures falling at a less severe rate as the data mix becomes less skewed towards the low end. The bottom will be cheered, recovery will be lauded by the spin machine known as the National Association of Realtors, and buyers around the country will be lured into a false sense of security that housing has finally hit rock bottom.

Meanwhile, back in reality, property values — actual homes, rather than statistics — will keep sliding.

By ANDREW JEFFERY

This post first appeared on Minyanville.

“If at first you don’t succeed, try, try again” - and you certainly can’t fault lawmakers for a lack of persistence in trying to stem the epidemic foreclosures plaguing America’s housing market.

Sadly, they insist on trying the same failed strategies over and over again.

For more than 18 months now, Congress has resolutely believed loan modifications are the path out of the housing jungle. But despite a blitzkrieg of public-relations campaigns and benevolent-sounding foreclosure-prevention programs like “Hope for Homeowners,” “HOPE NOW” and the latest, the Federal Reserve’s “Homeownership Preservation Policy,” modification efforts continue to sputter.

Even private-sector programs announced by big banks like Citigroup (C) and Bank of America (BAC) have had only marginal success.

After months of relentless pressure from the House and Senate alike, the Fed’s new policy allows it to review loans supporting the assets it purchased after it rescued Bear Stearns and AIG (AIG) for potential modifications. Barney Frank, the House Financial Services Committee Chairman, told reporters yesterday, “This is a very big deal.”

Actually, Mr. Frank, it’s not.

The assets acquired when the Fed and Treasury Department backed the JPMorgan (JPM) buyout of Bear Stearns and nationalized AIG were derivatives, not actual loans. These mortgage-backed securities are supported by thousands of individual mortgages, while the interest in those underlying loans was sliced up and allocated to countless securities, derivatives, and derivatives of derivatives.

Securities owners can’t modify mortgages: The rules about altering loan terms are pre-determined in securitization documents. It’s left up to loan servicers to implement the rules, whether the security owners like it or not.

Nevertheless, according to Bloomberg, the Fed — after identifying which loans it holds a fractional interest in — will encourage the servicers of those residential mortgage-backed securities “to implement a loan modification program that is consistent with this policy.”

Congress, Treasury and now the Fed have been trying to months now to get servicers on board with modification efforts, to no avail. Even the FDIC, whose highly touted modification program is being tried out at defunct California thrift IndyMac, has been unable to successfully – and sustainably — modify loans en masse.

The reason modification efforts aren’t working — amid evidence that Washington continues to ignore the root of the housing problem — is that the vast majority of loan defaults are being caused by job losses and negative equity. Borrowers can’t get a new loan without a job, nor can they qualify for a modification if they owe more on their house than it’s worth.

According to data released by JPMorgan yesterday, average equity for subprime loans stands at less than 5%.


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It’s negative for all Alt-A adjustable rate mortgages.



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Average equity in jumbo prime loans, which are experiencing defaults at faster rates than either subprime or Alt-A, has tumbled from 45% in January 2006 to less than 20% at the end of last year.


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And, even as regulators force mortgage rates down to record lows to encourage buyers to step in — catching the falling knife of tumbling home prices and risking financial ruin for the benefit of the rest of us — property values continue to fall.

Meanwhile, regulators and lawmakers continue to parade bold foreclosure-prevention efforts before the public. And they’ll keep trying - even if it bankrupts the country.

By ANDREW JEFFERY

This post first appeared on Minyanville.

$100 billion just isn’t what it used to be.

Over the weekend, Freddie Mac (FRE) requested a second draw on its Treasury Department credit facility, saying $30-35 billion would suffice to keep its net worth above zero, thank you very much. After taking $14 billion in the third quarter of last year, Freddie has now chewed through almost half its $100 billion taxpayer-provided safety net in just 5 months.

According to Bloomberg, Freddie’s fourth -quarter operating losses triggered the need for additional funds, as its massive mortgage portfolio continues to sour. Analysts expect Freddie’s sister company, Fannie Mae (FNM), to request a similar draw when it announces fourth-quarter results in February.

As one analyst told Bloomberg, “[Fannie and Freddie’s] losses are going to be much higher than anyone anticipated. The more and more that people are digging into these portfolios, they’re finding out the more and more these guys were doing subprime and Alt-A loans and classifying them as prime.”

Defaults on prime mortgages, which are supposed to be given out to borrowers with good credit and stable jobs, are now increasing at a faster rate than the subprime loans that get so much headline play. According to the latest Mortgage Bankers Association Delinquency Survey, 2.87% of all prime loans were delinquent in the third quarter of last year, up 85% from the same period a year ago.

Keep in mind those figures are through September 2008 and don’t include the abysmal economic conditions of the past 4 months. And as layoffs mount and the economy continues to contract, the previously well-to-do are facing the same economic hardships those “subprime” people have been dealing with for almost 2 years.

Fannie and Freddie, despite not technically being involved in subprime lending, drove industry trends, and, in many ways, set precedents followed by the rest of the mortgage industry. Their drive to automate the loan underwriting process created massive opportunities for fraud. Both savvy and ignorant originators easily duped the system, jamming subprime borrowers into prime loans, which neatly showed up on bank balance sheets as AAA-rated assets.

The sieve-like automated systems were adopted by other big lenders, such as Countrywide, Washington Mutual, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, IndyMac and Wachovia.

Now that none of those firms exist, loans originated under the guise of “prime” are turning out to be anything but. Bank of America (BAC), JPMorgan (JPM) and Wells Fargo (WFC), heretofore the strongest banks in the country, who absorbed many of those defunct lenders, are now faced with mounting losses on loans they thought were of the highest quality.

As I noted about this time last year, while everyone was so focused on subprime, prime mortgages — a market about 4 times as large — quietly presented a far bigger threat to the financial system. Now, as the government has bailed out 2 of the 4 remaining big American banks, those loans threaten the federal balance sheet.

Where’s TARP 2 when you need it?