This post first appeared on Minyanville.

There’s a good amount of buzz surrounding the Wall Street Journal’s piece on the staggering number of homeowners underwater on their mortgages. This, on the same day the Case-Shiller Home Price Index posted its fourth consecutive month-over-month increase.

Mixed signals? Possibly. But in reality, these two seemingly disparate data points suggest that even as foreclosure moratoria continue to keep bank-owned properties off the market — which is artificially limiting supply and creating the illusion of a tight housing market (the supply of existing homes is back to historical norms) — behind the scenes, more and more borrowers are falling behind, and staying that way.

The number of mortgages in the “90+ delinquency but not yet foreclosed” bucket is still growing and the rate of change is yet to slow. The looming backlog of foreclosures not yet completed is growing much faster than banks can (or are allowed to) push them through the system. Lender Processing Services (LPS), a spinoff of Fidelity National Information Services Inc. (FIS) estimates that 710,000 mortgages are more than six months delinquent but not yet in foreclosure. A year ago, that number was “just” 203,000.

So what does all this mean?

While another leg down in housing is certainly in the cards, another cliff-dive isn’t the likely scenario. Rather, a continued slow bleed, with increasing localization as certain markets recover while others languish. Second home and jumbo markets are still under pressure, even as investors feast on low-priced homes in some of the country’s seedier neighborhoods. But as long as the US government dominates the secondary market for mortgages (FHA/Fannie Mae (FNM)/Freddie Mac (FRE)/VA, etc), mortgages will be available to qualified (and unqualified, in the case of the FHA) buyers.

Betting on another all-out collapse in residential housing prices is akin to betting on the bankruptcy of the US government. Could it happen? Sure, but that certainly isn’t the base case.

A much more interesting (and profitable) bet is to find areas that have fundamental (ie, demographic) drivers for demand, and looking for affordable submarkets where demand is strong and not driven by the FHA. Are there a ton of these neighborhoods around? Nope, but they’re out there if you know how and where to look.

This post first appeared in the November edition of Cirios Trends: Getting to the Bottom of the Housing Market

Of the myriad debates ongoing at a time when economics and
politics are seemingly two heads of the same freakish snake, the role government should play in directing economic actions dominates an already ideologically charged arena.

And nowhere is the issue argued more hotly than in the trenches of the housing market.

Government, some say, should come to the rescue of Main Street, vindicating the evils of Wall Street greed and excess run amok. Who else will look out for the little guy if not our elected representatives?

Others disagree, fingering Washington as one of the primary culprits in an economic landscape characterized by artificially low interest rates, lax regulation and a political class that was in bed with the corporations it claimed to be policing.

In housing, it’s no secret that government involvement in the market has reached new heights. Virtually every mortgage written today is backed by some branch of the federal government, be it via the FHA, Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. Tax credits to first time buyers spurred a flurry of purchase transactions this summer and fall, and inventory levels have been kept low by ongoing foreclosure moratoria.

Interest rates remain stubbornly low, despite fears of inflation and a collapsing US currency.

As a result, in some of the hardest hit real estate markets, prices seem to have stabilized, as supply has dropped to, in some cases, less than a month of inventory.

At the heart of the debate, and a point which is widely under-reported in the mainstream press, is the effect of decades of aggressive policies aimed at encouraging lower income Americans to buy homes.

These directives created a deeply liquid and profitable arena into which Wall Street moved, seized upon, and ultimately cannibalized. That Congress is now actively leading a witch hunt to track down the “guilty” is highly ironic since only with the implicit blessing of Washington could Wall Street have committed its crimes.

Look at the graph in the top right corner of this page. Taxpayers are increasingly being asked to cover losses which Washington is unloading from the private sector onto the public balance sheet. This liability will be a drag on the economy for years to come.

One unfortunate result of this crisis is that Americans with less than ideal credit are seeing access to banking services stripped away at an alarming rate. And while justified in some cases, there is a place in our economy for non-prime lending, if done right.

As big banks withdraw from this arena, smarting from losses of a similar shape to the graph above, small, niche lenders can step in and fill the void. Opportunities abound, if you just know where to look.

This post first appeared in the November edition of Cirios Trends: Getting to the Bottom of the Housing Market

This piece first appeared on Minyanville.

By Andrew Jeffery

Reality, it appears, is a dish Washington believes is best served, never.

Late Friday evening on October 30th, long after most Americans had shut off their computer screens and turned their attention to more important things — namely, Halloween — banking regulators dropped a silent, rotten egg onto the financial system.

Despite an alarming increase in the number of troubled commercial real estate loans gumming up bank balance sheets, the Federal Reserve, FDIC, and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency issued new guidelines Friday easing the burden this souring debt will have on lenders. Regulators are encouraging banks to modify loans, rather than foreclose and repossess property, even if the value of the building has fallen below the amount of the loan.

Loan workouts, regulators argue, can be beneficial to both lender and borrower, and are preferred to foreclosures, which drag down prices. But one look at the earlier-to-crash residential real estate market quickly proves this notion as a fallacy.

In many of the hardest hit real estate markets, ones which imploded well before ill-fated mortgage modification attempts were launched, true price discovery was given a slim opening to take hold. Now, as prices have fallen back to more affordable levels, traditional homebuyers and real estate investors have stepped back into the market, helping to stabilize prices.

Sure, there’s still a healthy dose of government intervention propping up the housing market as a whole, but only through these fresh starts can markets begin a genuine healing process.

Well-to-do markets, on the other hand, have not yet had their requisite dose of price discovery, as corrective market mechanisms are being prevented from functioning. Foreclosure moratoria (ongoing) and modification efforts (floundering) are simply kicking the proverbial can down a long proverbial road.

So too in commercial real estate, as landlords face increasing vacancies, falling rents, and, according to the Wall Street Journal, $1.4 trillion in maturing loans over the next five years. Around half of these are said to be underwater, and thus cannot be refinanced at current price levels.

Regulators’ answer, not unlike the failed mortgage modification programs introduced by the Bush and continued by the Obama Administration, is to allow big banks like Citigroup, JPMorgan, and Bank of America to forestall the recognition of losses, trying to delay the inevitable bursting of the commercial real estate bubble.

With Wall Street’s collective eyes focused on Monday’s headlines — CIT’s bankruptcy, Goldman Sachs picking up tax credits from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and of course the Yankees a single win away from their twenty-seventh World Series title — regulators are hoping investors will ignore the stench of this well-timed announcement as just another holdover from Halloween revelry gone awry.

And while the new guidelines may bolster efforts to make the banking system look healthier than it actually is, it’s further proof that rumors of a legitimate economic recovery are, in fact, greatly overestimated.

By ANDREW JEFFERY

This post first appeared on Minyanville.

Every month, it seems, Washington dreams up new and fantastic ways to funnel taxpayer money towards a growing list of undeserving recipients.

Now, in the latest attempt to coerce banks into modifying delinquent mortgages en masse, the Treasury Department plans to offer cash incentives to lenders who lower interest rates or forgive principal on second liens (so-called “piggyback” loans). According to Bloomberg, the new program aims to simplify the modification process and help struggling borrowers avoid foreclosure.

The subprime second lien was a highly profitable, nearly usurious loan product that proliferated during the housing boom. Once reserved for high-quality borrowers and those with sufficient equity in their homes, seconds became an easy way to jam borrowers into homes they couldn’t otherwise afford.

If a homeowner wants to take out a first mortgage for more than 80% of the home’s value, he or she is typically required to take out mortgage insurance, issued by firms like Radian (RDN), MGIC Investment Corp (MTG) and the PMI Group (PMI). For years, the cost of insurance — plus the required down payment — limited home ownership to those who, by and large, could afford to buy responsibly.

But as housing demand ballooned from 2002 to 2005, banks discovered they could just loan borrowers the down-payment money – and charge a hefty fee to do so. Without those pesky requirements — and by bypassing the sometimes strict credit guidelines of mortgage insurers — banks were able to open up their loan products to a whole new group of unqualified borrowers.

Second liens, by virtue of being subordinate to first liens, carry additional risk, and thus a higher interest rate. In other words, if a borrower defaults, the holder of the second lien has to wait until the first mortgage holder is made whole before getting paid.

And since seconds carried super-high interest rates, securities backed by this type of loan offered juicy returns for investors. It should come as no surprise that the second-lien market was dominated by Bear Stearns (now JPMorgan (JPM)), Countrywide (now Bank of America (BAC)), and Citigroup (C) (now in hock to Uncle Sam for a cool $300 million).

Now, the Obama Administration wants to give billions to not only the banks who wrote these loans, but the borrowers who accepted them. The program is destined for failure.

In fact, it’s already failed.

A little over a year ago, Fannie Mae (FNM) and Freddie Mac (FRE) introduced an initiative called the “HomeSaver Advance.” Under the program, borrowers behind on their mortgage payments could take out an unsecured line of credit to get current. Under this program, Fannie and Freddie lent out $462 million over the course of the next 12 months.

Now, based on current market prices, the loans are worth a whopping $8 million, or $0.017 cents on the dollar. Talk about throwing good money after bad.

The President’s initiative to modify seconds is no different: It takes a situation destined for foreclosure and simply prolongs the agony. This prevents the borrower from getting out from under his mountain of debt and starting anew. Meanwhile, homes become ever more dilapidated, and banks further delay their own days of reckoning.

The rationale for this program is obscure – though it does provide yet another way to hand taxpayer money over to the very banks who got us into this mess in the first place.

By ANDREW JEFFERY

This post first appeared on Minyanville.

Despite recent reports to the contrary, the impending stabilization of the housing market is a myth. While declines in certain markets are coming to an end, real estate, in general, is still in freefall.

Last November, amidst a great deal of media fanfare, Fannie Mae (FNM) and Freddie Mac (FRE) enacted a temporary foreclosure moratorium, angling to give renewed loan modification efforts a chance to work. All the major financial news outlets jumped on the story, loudly proclaiming the mortgage giants were doing their part to give the housing market a chance to lick its wounds.

Then last week, without so much as a nod from the Wall Street Journal, Bloomberg or CNBC, the foreclosure ban was quietly lifted, right on schedule. A nod to the Washington Independent and Calculated Risk for picking up the story.

This is a not-insignificant development in the round of bottom-calling that’s gripped the world of real-estate punditry and prognostication.

Two datapoints are to blame for this misplaced optimism: A month-over-month increase in February new home sales, and one in existing home sales. In addition to rising transactions in the most depressed markets, many cite the eagerness of big banks like JPMorgan Chase (JPM), Citigroup (C) and Wells Fargo (WFC) to get foreclosed properties off their books a a sign supply is quickly being eaten through.

Meanwhile, reality tells a very different story.

In yesterday’s San Francisco Chronicle, Carolyn Said revealed a phenomenon familiar to real-estate insiders, but little appreciated by the financial world at large: phantom supply. Also known as “shadow inventory,” phantom supply represents homes banks have repossessed, but have yet to sell. In other words, it’s the pipeline of foreclosures still to come on the market.

According to data from RealtyTrac, a foreclosure monitoring service, banks are selling less than half the homes they take back from borrowers. This analysis is echoed by courthouse auction results, which show the vast majority of foreclosures are delayed, rather than being taken back by banks. Even fewer are being sold to third parties, which means asking prices are still too high.

Couple banks’ unwillingness to take back, market and sell properties with Fannie and Freddie’s recent lifting of their foreclosure ban, and improving housing data could prove to be short-lived. As one well-informed California real estate broker and Minyan writes, ”There is a huge logjam [of foreclosures]. With Fannie and Freddie’s recent announcement, the logjam may be coming undone.”

To be sure, being negative on the housing market is beating a very, very dead horse. However, with the spin experts at the National Association of Realtors flooding the market with ads — and with media cries of “stabilization” – prospective homebuyers should be skeptical of anyone who says the best deals will pass them by if they don’t act now.

By ANDREW JEFFERY

This post first appeared on Minyanville.

Unprecedented. Unpredictable. Unparalleled. Extraordinary.

These are the adjectives offered by mortgage industry executives defending their relative innocence in the collapse of the housing industry. Conditions, they argue, deteriorated so rapidly and in such unpredictable ways they couldn’t possibly batten down the hatches fast enough.

As it turns out, that’s not exactly true.

The Washington Post reports that chief executive offers at both Fannie Mae (FNM) and Freddie Mac (FRE) ignored warnings about their firms’ exposure to risky loans. The findings of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform are being discussed today on Capitol Hill.

At Freddie, an internal report explicitly warned that certain types of loans might default at a higher rate than expected if borrowers’ true financial positions were to be made known. Furthermore — and troubling insofar as these firms and their Washington backers actively pushed these risky loans on low income immigrant communities — senior executives were told many such mortgages could be particularly harmful for non-English-speaking homeowners, since many didn’t fully understand the confusing loan terms.

At Fannie, no smoking gun was produced, but the oversight committee discovered what it called an “underground” effort to actively buy subprime loans.

For their part, former Fannie CEO Daniel Mudd and deposed Freddie chief Richard Syron are directing the blame elsewhere – not surprising, given their well-documented penchant for obfuscation and finger-pointing. To Mudd and Syron, responsibility for the crash lies squarely at the feet of regulators and Congress: One was asleep at the wheel while bad loans ran rampant through industry as a whole; the other all but forced lenders to give out loans to under-qualified borrowers under the auspice of the Community Reinvestment Act, or CRA.

The CRA, introduced in the late 1970s but used by the Clinton administration to support the now-maligned American dream of home ownership, aims to give low-income borrowers equal access to cheap mortgages and other banking services. Think of it as reverse “red-lining,” which is the outlawed practice of refusing to lend in certain neighborhoods that may be perceived as riskier than others.

Homeownership rates — not to mention political backslapping — surged as the housing market boomed, even as borrowers became increasingly exposed to predatory lending and risky loans. Wall Street and banks like Bank of America (BAC), Citigroup (C) and JPMorgan (JPM) saw loan portfolios balloon as low interest rates, securitization and an influx of foreign money fueled the red-hot market.

A lucky few managed to sell at the top; the rest are now left holding the bag, with everything tenuously held together by an ad-hoc glue of taxpayer money and a ballooning national debt.

And while we now know how the story ends, the future, as they say, has yet to be written.

Mortgage regulations, as much as they’ve been tweaked since the crisis began, will undergo an even further-reaching overhaul by the time we emerge on the other side of this mess. Along with the rest the financial industry, laws regarding borrowing and lending are slated for massive changes in the coming years.

Regulators could choose to punish the industry and homeowners alike with oppressive rules and regulations, which will will push up interest rates and prolong the housing market’s eventual recovery. It will, however, do little to punish those actually responsible, since most have either lost their jobs or are living high off their spoils. Sadly, we appear well along this path.

The other option, however politically inexpedient it may be, is to once and for all remove the government crutch from the mortgage industry and let the free market determine interest rates, borrowing terms, and home prices.

To be clear, this is not to advocate lawless cowboy lending, but simple, prudent rules that protect borrower and lender alike without home loan subsidies in the form of artificially low interest rates.

At the center of any responsible regulatory regime is a realignment of incentives. The current system still rewards housing-market actors like real-estate agents and mortgage brokers for encouraging borrowers to make bad decisions. The higher a buyer’s price, the more an agent is paid; the more the terms of the loan favor the bank, the more a mortgage broker stands to profit. This needs to change.

And until it does, as George Santayana said, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”

This post first appeared on Minyanville.

Banning foreclosures is starting to gain momentum in Washington: This isn’t good.

Barak Obama, the current frontrunner in the race for the White House, recently floated a plan for a 90-day moratorium on foreclosures by certain banks, along with other initiatives to revive the economy.

While Obama’s heart may be in the right place with respect to homeowners, current efforts to stem foreclosures by making it harder for banks to take back houses are largely misguided. Preventing banks from exercising their rights as debt holders could have negative consequences for all homeowners. For the ones facing foreclosure, a moratorium is likely to delay in the inevitable.

Mortgage rates are kept low largely because banks can repossess a home if the borrower stops making payments. Even if a homeowner declares bankruptcy, the it can still take back the house. It may seem cruel, but it’s one of the primary reasons banks are willing to give out hundreds of thousands of dollars in support of home ownership.

By taking away their loss mitigation tool, or even by threatening to limit their ability to foreclose, banks will demand a higher return for the risk they undertake in lending. This means higher interest rates, tighter qualification requirements and home prices far lower than they are today.

We must find effective ways to limit the damage of the housing market’s collapse without endangering the eventual recovery of one of America’s most essential markets.

Case in point: California. The epicenter of the housing market’s implosion recently enacted legislation forcing lenders to jump through additional hoops before starting the foreclosure process. Aimed at finding common ground between lenders and troubled borrowers, the state saw a dramatic 62% drop in notice of default filings — which mark the start of the foreclosure process — a month after the new law took effect.

On the surface this may sound encouraging, but digging deeper, it appears the data simply reflect a brief interruption in the prevailing trend. Sean O’Toole, founder of research firm ForeclosureRadar, told Housing Wire:

Given the significant negative equity now occurring in most California foreclosures, modifying loans to affordable levels either requires large principal balance reductions, or extending the unsustainable teaser rates that created the foreclosure crisis in the first place.

Wide-scale adoption of large principal balance reductions also poses significant risks, as they are likely to encourage non-defaulting homeowners to default in the hopes of securing similar reductions. As such, either type of loan modification is likely to result in increased default, and/or foreclosure activity in the future, a consequence clearly not intended.

Foreclosures are a necessary, if painful, aspect of the housing cycle – and a requisite part of any sustainable market recovery. And while there are measures the government can take to prevent foreclosures without sacrificing the necessary price discovery the market so desperately needs, they must not be banned outright. Not even for a few months.

The guilty are being punished, albeit slowly.

Bank of America (BAC) recently had to fork over $8 billion to settle lawsuits filed against Countrywide, which it purchased earlier this year. Fannie Mae (FNM) and Freddie Mac (FRE) are being sued by angry shareholders who felt they were misled about the companies’ financial strength. Bear Stearns is gone, as are IndyMac and Lehman Brothers. And While this may offer little solace to upside-down homeowners, it’s evidence the free market is still functioning (however deep it may become buried under government intervention).

Significant increases in mortgage regulations are already in the works: A more restrictive set of rules is the only sure bet in today’s housing market.  However, in so doing, it’s important that we not block out an entire subsection of the population - those with poor or undeveloped credit, who are nonetheless worthy of and responsible enough to own a home.

These distinctions were badly blurred and blatantly exploited during the boom, but that’s not reason enough to preclude millions of deserving families from realizing the American dream of homeownership in the decades to come.

The former Goldman Sachs employees — err, the federal government — have decided to bail out Fannie and Freddie and the race to call another bottom in equities, not to mention housing, is on.

Reality, however, is not a friend of these hopeful bulls.

Let’s take a quick scan of the economic landscape and see what issues the latest bailout has solved.

• - The unemployment rate seems to only be going up, and unless the new federal agency charged with keeping tabs on the two mortgage giants is hiring en masse, there won’t be much of a change here.
• - The dollar could see its recent rally erased after our trading partners and investors around the world come to terms with the $200 billion the Treasury department just dumped into the blender to cut 50 bps off mortgage rates. And, take note, those are prime, Agency rates, and that’s it.
• - The unfortunate reality is that most Americans are still in debt and cannot afford a down payment on a house, a requirement that’s yet to be removed.
• - Gas prices have fallen, but not by as much as crude prices. Hurricane season is alive and well, threatening most of the gulf oil rigs. Oil companies are already under pressure from tumultuous markets for their black gold and are not likely inclined to lower prices further.

As painful as it is to admit, Fannie and Freddie probably needed to be bailed out to keep the entire financial market from collapsing but it doesn’t mean we are at “the bottom.”

It takes awhile for a fundamental shift in lending to play its way out and that is what we are in the middle of. The middle class is being squeezed more than ever and consumer credit quality on the whole is not going to start improving tomorrow.

More important than any of these points is we do not know what our friends at the government are going to do with Fannie and Fredie and how long it is going to take them to do it. In fact, trusting the very folks who ran these companies into the ground — albeit under different leadership — to turn them around is hardly a comforting proposition.

In the end, we need to remember that you need a good credit score and a down payment to buy a house in the real world. So no matter what a television analyst on TV who makes $500,000 a year tells you, this credit crisis is far from over.

This post first appeared on Minyanville and our sister site Dawn Patrol.

It looks like all those short-sellers might have been on to something.

Freddie Mac (FRE), the beleaguered mortgage giant that was just weeks ago on the brink of collapse, released second quarter results this morning that were nothing short of abysmal. Along with the financial backing of you, me and all the other US taxpayers, the government-sponsored enterprise now has:

• $831 million loss or $1.63 per share, compared with net income of $729 million a year ago.
• Revenue fell 28% to $1.69 billion compared to last year.
• $2.5 billion in credit loss provisions and $1 billion in mortgage-related writedowns.
• Board approval to slash dividends from $0.25 per share to “$0.05 or less”.
• The intention to raise $5.5 billion or more in fresh capital.

Although the company currently meets capital requirements demanded by its regulator, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, it may fall below those levels if the housing and credit markets continue to deteriorate.

Last month, shares plunged on fears that Freddie and its larger cousin Fannie Mae (FNM) would crumble under the weight of mounting losses in their massive mortgage portfolios. The Treasury Department tried to shore up confidence by demanding Congressional approval to support the 2 companies, should the need arise.

Treasury announced this week it had hired Morgan Stanley (MS) to help sort out the mess and assess the two companies’ financial positions.

It takes a very active imagination to think a company capitalized with just $37 billion to support more than $2 trillion in U.S. mortgage debt is anything resembling stable.

Although Fannie and Freddie managed to avoid buying the worst of the subprime mortgages originated during the housing boom, many equally toxic Alt-A and other non-prime loans made it onto their balance sheets. Even marginally savvy originators were able to exploit their automated underwriting and risk systems, resulting in the loss of billions of dollars from questionable loans.

Fannie and Freddie are now paying for their transgressions – or rather, the American taxpayer is paying, since Congress gave Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson what amounts to a blank check to bail out the two failed companies.

The only questions left are: When will Fannie and Freddie collapse, and what form will they take thereafter?

Many advocate for privatization, splitting the firms into several publicly traded companies. Others, mindful of the Federal government’s tendency to privatize profits and socialize losses, expect outright nationalization.

One near-certainty, irrespective of the outcome of their current crisis, is that Fannie and Freddie’s ability to keep mortgages rates artificially low will be greatly reduced. That doesn’t bode well for anyone considering buying a house in the next 20 years.