By ANDREW JEFFERY

This post first appeared on Minyanville.

Mortgage guidelines have become increasingly strict — not to mention regimented — as the private secondary-mortgage market has all but disappeared in the past 24 months. But according to the Wall Street Journal, appraisals are increasingly becoming one of the biggest hurdles for new purchase and refinance transactions.

In the wake of the recent collapse in home prices, appraisers have come under fire for bowing to lender demands during the boom, offering up property values more aligned with lenders’ wishes than with reality. In 2007, the state of New York sued Washington Mutual — now owned by JPMorgan (JPM) — for colluding with a subsidiary of First American Corporation to overinflate home values.

Collusion between appraisers and mortgage brokers, real-estate agents, banks, and borrowers helped fuel runaway price appreciation. In response, Fannie Mae (FNM) and Freddie Mac (FRE) — the 2 government-owned giants that control around two-thirds of the mortgage market — issued new guidelines dictating how lenders can select and evaluate appraisals. The new policies went into effect May 1.

To help facilitate the new, tighter rules, lenders are using appraisal management companies, or AMCs, which employ networks of appraisers around the country to provide what purport to be unbiased value analysis. All this, of course, comes at a cost which is ultimately borne by borrowers.

And, in what could be considered ironic if it weren’t so repellent, appraisers are crying foul.

This from a group whose moral backbone during the housing boom most closely resembled that of a jellyfish – one seemingly incapable of preventing its members from being wooed by banks into committing fraud.

An appraisal is simply one person’s opinion of a home’s value on a given day. And although that person is licensed to provide such an opinion, the very nature of an appraisal renders its usefulness as a true risk management tool questionable at best.

The growing use of AMCs, opponents argue, reduces appraisal quality even as it increases costs. Appraisers are selected based on proprietary quality scoring mechanisms employed by each AMC, which may or may not be a good measure of reliability. And since AMCs take on average a 40% cut on the total appraisal fees and lenders demand quick turnaround, appraisers are working for less on a tighter timeline.

Sure, fraud may be reduced, but incompetence could more than make up for that as AMCs scramble to employ barely capable appraisers in order to ensure complete geographic coverage for their clients.

The real losers in all this — as is the case when poorly conceived regulation is aimed at making up for past mistakes without proper consideration for the root cause of those mistakes — are homeowners, who must now pay more for a property valuation mechanism that isn’t likely to be much better than the old one.

By ANDREW JEFFERY

This post first appeared on Minyanville.

With millions of homeowners falling behind on their monthly payments, one in 6 underwater, and countless more struggling to keep up, politicians and banks alike are jumping on the loan modification bandwagon.

A modification – or “mod,” as it’s known in the industry — is simply the bank agreeing to change a borrower’s loan to make it more affordable. Mods usually result in a lower interest rate, principal forgiveness or some combination thereof.

For banks, adjusting loan terms is a way to keep cash coming in the door - even if it’s less than they’d been hoping for when they originally wrote the loan. For troubled borrowers, mods can provide an alternative to default and eventual foreclosure. It’s for these reasons that FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair and big banks like JPMorgan (JPM) and Bank of America (BAC) are aggressively promoting mods as the best way to fix the housing market.

The flood of troubled mortgages has also fostered a cottage industry that caters to distressed borrowers. Some are honest folks aiming to help struggling borrowers by using their mortgage expertise and contacts to negotiate better deals on behalf of their clients.

Others, however, are less upstanding.

According to Mandana Nejad, a real estate attorney and founder of Silver Lining Legal Group, a loan modification firm based in California, troubled borrowers have a lot to be wary of.

“Most loan modification companies are compromised of former lenders and brokers who put homeowners in these horrible loans in the first place,” says Nejad. ”Meanwhile, credit repair and debt consolidation firms are simply out to collect fees, regardless of whether or not they can actually successfully modify a loan.”

Last year, the Bush administration formed HOPE NOW, a government-led effort to get banks and the loan servicers who collect payments on their behalf to step up loan-modification efforts. By most accounts, results were underwhelming, as HOPE NOW counselors often asked for too much, and banks gave too little.

Data show that mods done at the outset of the mortgage crisis ended up in default, despite the lower payments. Without proper screening criteria, mods simply delay the inevitable.

For a mod to work, lenders and borrowers must be able to find common ground. Falling home prices, job losses and massive fraud at the time of origination have exacerbated the challenge of finding new loan terms that make sense for both parties. To complicate matters, if a loan has been packaged into a security, loan servicers are obligated to follow predetermined modification standards set by myriad third-party investors.

Borrowers looking to handle modifications on their own face a maze of legal and bureaucratic complications - not to mention the stress of negotiating to save one’s own home. Nejad tells her clients that anyone can attempt to modify their loan themselves, but doing so requires knowledge of the best strategies for success.

Banks treat mods almost like a fresh loan. In order to get the best deal, borrowers must submit a complete application, write a compelling hardship letter, include verification of income, and often support the home’s current value with an appraisal.

While this is no easy task, troubled borrowers shouldn’t run out and answer the first debt consolidation or mortgage relief advertisement they hear on the radio.

Upstanding modification firms should offer:

• Money back guarantees with no exclusions
• At least one experienced attorney assigned to each case
• Direct access to the borrower’s lender(s)
• No more than a 50% charge up front
• Verifiable success stories, not just web testimonials

Still, successful mods require lenders to take losses. Armed with billions in bailout money, banks are now in a better position to allow their borrowers more affordable loans, even if it means more writedowns and less interest income going forward.

Time will be the true arbiter for the success of Bank of America and JPMorgan’s recent plans, but as pressure mounts to seriously curtail foreclosures, more and more federal money will be thrown at the problem. Other banks are likely to follow suit.

Wells Fargo (WFC) has yet to announce a plan of its own, but – given its recent purchase of Wachovia (WB) and its inheritance of a massive portfolio of California option-ARMs – we shouldn’t have to wait too much longer.

While mods are by no means the magic bullet many are searching for to fix the housing mess, they do offer a way for lenders to retain a cash-generating loan – and borrowers to keep their homes.

What’s the silent killer that’s been largely ignored by the financial media as it tries to keep up with the quickly unraveling mortgage crisis? Fraud.

While there are many causes for the current meltdown, the most unexplored and and least discussed is fraud. FraudBlogger.com reported yesterday that there were $1.7 billion active cases of criminal and civil fraud reported in the second quarter of 2008.

While large, this number is painfully low and doesn’t come close to capturing what was really going on in the mortgage origination business from 2005-2007. Every time a loan officer put a borrower into a loan he couldn’t afford or didn’t understand, the loan officer committed fraud. The vast majority of these loans are still out there, and the tabulated fraud data doesn’t pick them up.

Every time an appraiser valued a property based on the lender’s demand for an overstated value, the appraiser committed fraud. You and I, the taxpayers, will now get to foot the bill for all that equity appraisers created out of thin air to maintain the facade of unbiased property valuations.

Every time an accountant booked the fully amortized interest payment as income for an Option-ARM borrower making the minimum payment, while adhering to GAAP, we can all agree there isn’t any chance that money will find its way to the bank’s coffers. By the time the loan’s written off, it will be lost in a web of billions in writedowns, and the accountant will be on to mis-pricing some other asset sitting on the bank’s books.

And people still wonder why the mortgage mess keeps getting worse than even the most boogly bears have expected.