By ANDREW JEFFERY

This post first appeared on Minyanville.

While pundits and politicians debate the various aspects of President Obama’s $275 billion housing bailout, one piece of data proves just how misguided federal efforts to revitalize the housing market are: $275 billion could buy more than half of all American homes already in foreclosure.

Such an undertaking would remove distressed homes from the market and spur community revitalization efforts throughout areas desperately in need of the hope they were promised in November.

According to real-estate analytics website Realtytrac.com, foreclosures were filed on 2,330,483 homes in 2008, up 83% from the year before. The median home price in the US is $180,100 - which means 1,526,929 of those homes could be bought with $275 billion. And since foreclosures are centered primarily in areas with low home values, the true number of properties the bailout money could be used to buy is likely much higher.

While the logistics for such an outrageously common-sense solution to the nation’s housing woes are daunting, they’re no less challenging than the massive loan modification efforts already in place. And their results continue to prove underwhelming, at best.

Such a solution also addresses the rapidly mounting discontent over bailing out those homeowners who made bad decisions. Distressed borrowers wouldn’t directly receive any taxpayer money – though they would indirectly benefit from the massive government expenditure in their community.

Cash would be funneled down to the local level, where cities and counties could more effectively distribute it. To be sure, local governments can be as bureaucratic and inefficient as Washington — not to say corrupt – but by allocating capital to localities, each community would be responsible for its own clean-up efforts.

Private investors, developers, nonprofits and real-estate professionals could compete for business, adding a free-market component to rescue efforts – and even spurring a little sorely-needed economic activity.

Some cities aren’t content to wait for federal money to trickle down from the White House. Menlo Park, California, best known for its devotion to the bubble lifestyle, is considering using city money to buy and refurbish foreclosed homes.

The town, like many others in America, is split by a highway that acts as a major dividing line between the haves and the have-nots. While there are just 97 homes in foreclosure in Menlo Park, the vast majority are on “the other side of the tracks,” away from the mansions and quiet, tree-lined streets of West Menlo. The proposal will use money from a $2 million fund already seeded by developers who opted not to allocate units for low-income housing.

The city plans to tap Habitat for Humanity to refurbish the homes, using community volunteers and local experts to oversee the improvements. The president of the local Homeowners Association, Ash Vasudeva, said “When rehabilitation is going on, it uplifts the entire community.” A simple statement, but true.

And while this is one small city undertaking one small project, it could serve as a model for other communities around the country. Not to mention the fact that the mere announcement of $275 billion in real-estate investments would hasten the price discovery the housing market so sorely needs.

Furthermore, banks stand to gain little from such a use of public funds – which could be why such a plan has yet to be proposed on Capitol Hill. When a bank forecloses on a home, JPMorgan Chase (JPM), Wells Fargo (WFC) or Citigroup (C) is forced to write the asset down to at least the amount of the outstanding loan. But since most properties are worth far less than the loan amount, selling the property at market prices would require further writedowns.

So, as banks soak up billions in bailout money under the auspices of massive loan modification efforts aimed at stemming foreclosures, vacant homes lay in disrepair, vagrants loot the pipes – and communities continue to deteriorate.

But instead of allocating funds for such grassroots efforts, Washington continues to issue broad, vague orders aimed at helping many, but in very small amounts. Such programs have failed before, and they’ll fail again.

Maybe it’s time for a new approach.

This post first appeared on Minyanville.

Yesterday, I criticized Washington’s $700 billion financial bailout plan for missing the point. It fails to address the root of the problems facing the housing market and, by extension, the rest of the economy: Negative equity or a homeowner owing more on his house than it’s worth.

On The Exchange, several sharp-minded Minyans pressed for details on how the government could execute a program to “absorb negative equity” in a fair, equitable, efficient manner – and without bankrupting the entire country.

To be clear, I’m fundamentally opposed to government intervention into the free market beyond a requisite regulatory capacity. I’m also deeply skeptical that government can manage any program, large or small, with even the slightest degree of aptitude.

Unfortunately, the usefulness of ideological debate is growing fainter by the day. Practical solutions must be put forth and implemented immediately, lest we slip further toward a second Great Depression. Historians are welcome to argue semantics while we get down to fixing the problem. Only a mixture of public and private enterprise can repair the damage.

Negative equity creates a number of serious problems for the housing market, such as:

Foreclosures

Negative equity turns defaults into foreclosures. Delinquent borrowers can sell their way out of the problem if they can find a buyer at a level higher than their outstanding mortgage (plus closing costs and real estate agent commissions). But being underwater makes this impossible without coming up with the difference between the loan amount and the sale price.This is cash most struggling homeowners simply don’t have.

Oversupply

Negative equity exacerbates existing oversupply issues, pushing home prices down further. Sellers who haven’t yet missed a payment must list their house at least as high as their outstanding mortgage. But if a homeowner is upsidedown, the property gets listed too high and stays there. Borrowers must then choose to continue pouring money into a losing bet, while hoping someone buys their house at well above its market value. The alternative is to default and end up in foreclosure.

Bank losses

Once a mortgage becomes delinquent, banks must write down the asset and take a loss. Not only is the loan impaired because of the delinquency, but negative equity enhances the bank’s losses. As property values fall, balance sheets become even more impaired, mortgage-backed securities continue to lose value and the entire financial system becomes even more desperate for capital.

Banks are bleeding cash: JP Morgan (JPM), Wells Fargo (WFC), Citigroup (C) and Bank of America (BAC) all recently announced reduced earnings and were forced to take equity injections from the Treasury. Lenders are reticent to accept short sales (allowing borrowers to accept a sale price lower than the loan amount without making up the difference) because they can’t handle the losses.

Now, for the solution(s).

There’s no magic bullet, no one solution that can, in one fell swoop, wipe the slate clean. As I’ve described it, “sopping up negative equity” is an immensely complicated task. The mortgage industry is massive, inefficient, disjointed, riddled with redundancy, buried in paperwork and plagued by bad regulation and misplaced incentives. In short, it’s a mess. Cleaning it up will take a very, very long time.

Still, I’d argue spending money on the programs below — without any hope of it being returned — is a better use of taxpayer funds than watching hundreds of billions of dollars simply disappear into the opaque balance sheets of what remains of the financial system.

There may be additional solutions, but this laser focus on earning taxpayers a return on their investment dilutes the effectiveness of many important initiatives.

Principal Forgiveness

Fannie Mae (FNM) and Freddie Mac (FRE) are already experimenting with a pilot program to give borrowers the amount of their negative equity as an unsecured loan. Based on the most recent appraisal (appraisals are, for all their faults, currently the most accurate way to value individual homes), Fannie and Freddie could pay down the negative equity — plus some cushion for future depreciation — and refinance the existing loan at, say, an 80% loan to value.

Even if the government-sponsored enterprises started with just their own portfolio, that would be a huge step in the right direction. For loans owned by banks and in securities, Fannie and Freddie could pay off the mortgage at the outstanding balance, forgive the necessary principal and write a new loan.

At this point, the homeowner is free to sell the house at the new, lower market price (price discovery) or go on making the now much-more-manageable mortgage payments.

Shared Equity

Banks could “sell” negative equity to Treasury, sharing any future upside based on each party’s pro rata share of the home’s current value (again, we’re forced to use appraisals because there just is not a better option – yet). When the home sells, the bank and Treasury would participate in any future appreciation. If the home’s value continues to slide, the bank is less exposed to the losses.

Bank’s could effectively choose the amount they write off: The more they receive from Treasury, the less upside exposure they retain. On the flip side, stronger banks would be able to write off just enough to stay afloat without losing future earnings potential.

The U.K. is already trying a version of this program.

Homeowners, out from underneath the negative equity and armed with lower mortgage payments could stay in their homes or sell at the current market price. Again, forced price discovery while keeping people in their homes.

Community Redevelopment

I believe the best way out of this mess is to set up a federal land bank system, where funds are distributed by the Treasury to local community development organizations and vetted real estate developers. I recognize the potential for bureaucratic abuses, but unfortunately the government is the only organization with the scope to handle the problem on a national scale.

Just as we now have a Bailout Czar, we need a Housing Bailout Czar to oversee such a program. I’m sure Goldman Sachs (GS) could send up another of its finest for the betterment of the country.

Groups like Habitat For Humanity, which have existing ties in the community and teams of professional and volunteer contractors, could dramatically help rebuild struggling communities with requisite resources from the federal government. These groups could either buy foreclosed properties, refurbish them and rent them out, write low cost mortgages through the land bank or offer up funds to enable banks to accept short sales.

If there’s a better use for taxpayer money than rebuilding communities after a tragedy, helping families put their lives back together – I’m not sure what it is.

Will some speculators be helped in the process? Probably. But the good news is the widespread economic implications of this crisis, which are now inevitable, will take care of much of the moral hazard we so fervently argue against.

Not every stock speculator was taught his lesson after the stock market crash of 1929, but the Great Depression did affect an entire generation, encouraging thrift and aversion to risk for decades. Now isn’t the time to take the moral high ground, only to watch our cities washed away by the rising flood of poverty.

This isn’t socialism, it’s being American.