By ANDREW JEFFERY

This post first appeared on Minyanville.

Foreclosure: It’s not just for those “subprime” people anymore.

Besieged by collapsing home prices and frightened banks scrounging for cash, even the real-estate industry’s brightest stars are finding there’s no place to hide. According to the New York Times, small and mid-size homebuilders who thrived during the housing boom are seeing credit lines pulled even before they miss a payment.

Banks like JPMorgan (JPM) and GMAC, the financing arm of General Motors (GM), loaned builders hundreds of billions of dollars — even as the housing market began to falter — to buy up vacant land. Now that demand for new homes has plunged (and buyers in some areas can pick up previously constructed homes for less than it costs to build a new one), builders’ ability to turn a profit has been effectively eliminated.

It’s estimated that over 20% of the nation’s homebuilders have closed their doors, even as big builders like D.R. Horton (DHI), Lennar (LEN) and Toll Brothers (TOL) limp along, bleeding cash and fighting for survival.

Lenders, for their part, are scrambling to mitigate risk.

Collateral, the term used to describe the assets against which loans are given out, protects lenders in the event of borrower default. As the value of collateral rises, banks become better protected since their loans are now backed up by a more valuable asset. In a downturn, however, falling collateral values means risk increases with each passing day.

In response, banks may ask borrowers to send in cash to make up for the lost value of their investment. These margin calls, as they’re known, can quickly force small firms into insolvency.

Such was the case for Brown Family Communities, a well-known builder in the Phoenix area. The Times reports the firm’s lender, JPMorgan, demanded millions in cash for land on the outskirts of town that had fallen in value. Brown balked, since he was yet to miss a payment and had been a longstanding client of the bank with an impeccable record. Ultimately, Brown lost the property and closed his doors, complaining “The real estate market is gone.”

Other builders have suffered a similar fate, proving that despite extensive government-led efforts to minimize losses from investments gone awry, the fundamental tenets of capitalism remain intact.

Bad investments should yield losses, period. Savvy new buyers, able to handle the risk inherent in buying distressed properties, can make bets that have the potential to reap huge rewards. This cycle of profits and losses fuels economic expansion. By forestalling losses, intervention delays recovery.

The speculative buying of vacant desert land on the edges of the Phoenix city limits in 2005 and 2006 certainly qualifies as a poor use of borrowed money. That builders are being asked for cash to cover banks’ potential losses should be seen as nothing more than prudent lending – something builders and other real-estate investors spent the boom years conveniently forgetting.

This post first appeared on Minyanville and our sister site Dawn Patrol.

After leading the banking sector to its largest ever one-day drop yesterday, Washington Mutual (WM), in an effort to assuage concerns that it’s facing a cash crunch, released a statement claiming that the bank is “well-capitalized.”

Though the stock bucked the trend this morning as the broader financial complex continued its unrelenting sell-off, shareholders aren’t likely to be comforted by the WaMu’s pleas for calm.

The largest savings-and-loan in the country has seen share prices fall below $4 following the seizure of IndyMac (IMB) by benevolent federal banking regulators; investors fear WaMu could be next.

IndyMac was reopened on Monday to handle endless lines of depositors hoping to recover their pennies from the bank’s coffers.

In a stark reminder of just how dicey bottom-picking can be, Bloomberg reminded us that private-equity firm TPG led a consortium of investors in providing the bank with $7 billion in much-needed cash in April, when the stock traded at $13. Those daring saviors have seen most of their investment wiped out.

TPG did, however, slip a protective clause into the deal: If the stock drops below $8.75 — which it clearly has — TPG is owed the difference, effectively putting the bank on the hook for its own equity losses. While protecting TPG’s investment, this feature also makes it considerably more costly, if not impossible, for the bank to raise more capital, which would further dilute shares.

As more details emerge about these and other onerous terms with which banks have been forced to agree in their efforts to raise capital, it’s becoming clear just how misguidedly optimistic investors were when such deals were first announced. Banking expert Minyan Peter wrote of the WaMu deal:

“I think the problem for most market participants right now is the assumption [that] what we’re experiencing looks something like ‘their prior experiences in banking crises.’ And to me, that’s why we have seen such a big rally over the past two weeks — because, based on prior experience, a rally feels very right, right about now.

But for all the reasons I shared before, this one is different.”

We’re now seeing just how different this one is.

Professor Depew explained Friday how the Fannie Mae (FNM) and Freddie Mac (FRE) crisis is different from the Long-Term Capital Management failure in 1998: In this case, massive losses by financial institutions around the world are a symptom, not the cause.

A few misplaced bets aren’t to blame for the market turmoil; neither is rumor-mongering. The financial system’s problems, and by extension the economy’s, are rooted in years of mispriced risk and excessive leverage. Markets are now witnessing the destruction of that debt at a rate that’s stomach-churning to the traditional buy-and-hold investor.

The process, though painful, is necessary. The debt will be destroyed, firms will go out of business and the economy will slow, if not contract. All this is healthy. Agonizing, to be sure, but healthy.

As Toddo wrote yesterday on the Buzz and Banter, “The big picture blues will lead to an unfortunate destination, but that’s necessary to rebuild the foundation for sustainable economic growth. Once we get there, those with capital will be in a fantastic position to prosper.”

What’s the silent killer that’s been largely ignored by the financial media as it tries to keep up with the quickly unraveling mortgage crisis? Fraud.

While there are many causes for the current meltdown, the most unexplored and and least discussed is fraud. FraudBlogger.com reported yesterday that there were $1.7 billion active cases of criminal and civil fraud reported in the second quarter of 2008.

While large, this number is painfully low and doesn’t come close to capturing what was really going on in the mortgage origination business from 2005-2007. Every time a loan officer put a borrower into a loan he couldn’t afford or didn’t understand, the loan officer committed fraud. The vast majority of these loans are still out there, and the tabulated fraud data doesn’t pick them up.

Every time an appraiser valued a property based on the lender’s demand for an overstated value, the appraiser committed fraud. You and I, the taxpayers, will now get to foot the bill for all that equity appraisers created out of thin air to maintain the facade of unbiased property valuations.

Every time an accountant booked the fully amortized interest payment as income for an Option-ARM borrower making the minimum payment, while adhering to GAAP, we can all agree there isn’t any chance that money will find its way to the bank’s coffers. By the time the loan’s written off, it will be lost in a web of billions in writedowns, and the accountant will be on to mis-pricing some other asset sitting on the bank’s books.

And people still wonder why the mortgage mess keeps getting worse than even the most boogly bears have expected.