This post first appeared in the November edition of Cirios Trends: Getting to the Bottom of the Housing Market

Of the myriad debates ongoing at a time when economics and
politics are seemingly two heads of the same freakish snake, the role government should play in directing economic actions dominates an already ideologically charged arena.

And nowhere is the issue argued more hotly than in the trenches of the housing market.

Government, some say, should come to the rescue of Main Street, vindicating the evils of Wall Street greed and excess run amok. Who else will look out for the little guy if not our elected representatives?

Others disagree, fingering Washington as one of the primary culprits in an economic landscape characterized by artificially low interest rates, lax regulation and a political class that was in bed with the corporations it claimed to be policing.

In housing, it’s no secret that government involvement in the market has reached new heights. Virtually every mortgage written today is backed by some branch of the federal government, be it via the FHA, Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. Tax credits to first time buyers spurred a flurry of purchase transactions this summer and fall, and inventory levels have been kept low by ongoing foreclosure moratoria.

Interest rates remain stubbornly low, despite fears of inflation and a collapsing US currency.

As a result, in some of the hardest hit real estate markets, prices seem to have stabilized, as supply has dropped to, in some cases, less than a month of inventory.

At the heart of the debate, and a point which is widely under-reported in the mainstream press, is the effect of decades of aggressive policies aimed at encouraging lower income Americans to buy homes.

These directives created a deeply liquid and profitable arena into which Wall Street moved, seized upon, and ultimately cannibalized. That Congress is now actively leading a witch hunt to track down the “guilty” is highly ironic since only with the implicit blessing of Washington could Wall Street have committed its crimes.

Look at the graph in the top right corner of this page. Taxpayers are increasingly being asked to cover losses which Washington is unloading from the private sector onto the public balance sheet. This liability will be a drag on the economy for years to come.

One unfortunate result of this crisis is that Americans with less than ideal credit are seeing access to banking services stripped away at an alarming rate. And while justified in some cases, there is a place in our economy for non-prime lending, if done right.

As big banks withdraw from this arena, smarting from losses of a similar shape to the graph above, small, niche lenders can step in and fill the void. Opportunities abound, if you just know where to look.

This post first appeared on Minyanville.

Appraisers just can’t get it right.

During the housing boom, mortgage brokers, real-estate agents, and even borrowers sought out appraisals supporting the highest possible home price. Appraisers, fearful of losing business, inflated their valuation findings, which exacerbated the run-up in home prices.

Now, after nearly 4 years of home-price declines, appraisers are getting it wrong again — but in the other direction.

On May 1 — while the financial media focused on construing a blip up in housing data as signs of an imminent bottom — little was made of new appraisal guidelines that went live and immediately began to eat away at the core of the nascent housing “recovery.” To be sure, trade groups like the Mortgage Bankers Association and the National Association of Realtors (NAR) fought the revised rules, but to no avail.

Stemming from a lawsuit filed by New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo alleging Washington Mutual (JPM) and First American Corp illegally conferred on the results of home appraisals with the goal of inflating prices, the new rules put up a Chinese wall between banks like Citigroup (C), Wells Fargo (WFC), Bank of America (BAC), and appraisers. The goal was to create an environment where appraisals would reflect an expert’s unbiased assessment of a home’s true value, rather than evaluations tailored to a lender’s desire to make a loan.

The new rules affect loans guaranteed by Fannie Mae (FNM) and Freddie Mac (FRE), but since the 2 government-run mortgage giants effectively control the secondary mortgage market, they’ve become the defacto guidelines for the entire industry.

In order to separate lenders and appraisers, appraisal-management companies (AMCs), cropped up, offering banks access to a network of appraisers around the country. This makes the appraiser selection process random, preventing collusion. And while AMCs claim appraisers are selected using proprietary scoring algorithms that evaluate performance, the reality is that jobs are handed out on the basis of fastest turnaround time and lowest cost.

In short, we’ve traded bias for incompetence.

Readers of this column know that I have little, if anything good to say about the NAR — which is not only the Realtors’ trade organization, but a powerful Washington lobby. Nevertheless, earlier this week, when the NAR released data on existing home sales, their statement about appraisers’ role in killing purchase transactions was dead on the mark:

“The increase in sales is less than expected because poor appraisals are stalling transactions. Pending home sales indicated much stronger activity, but some contracts are falling through from faulty valuations that keep buyers from getting a loan. Lenders are using appraisers who may not be familiar with a neighborhood, or who compare traditional homes with distressed and discounted sales.”

Currently embroiled in this very scenario, my firm, Cirios Real Estate, is witnessing first-hand just how bad the new appraisal rules are.

Assessing a property’s value in’t rocket science, despite appraisers’ claim that their extensive training and years of experience make them the only people qualified to determine home prices. All it takes is access to the right information, an understanding of what drives desirability, and a little pride in one’s work.

That last criterion is perhaps the most difficult to find. Appraisers earn a flat fee for their services, giving them little incentive to provide the best analysis possible. Knowing they can now earn repeat business by turning around jobs in 48 hours and charging less than their competitors, there’s little reason to go the extra mile to ensure appraisals take into consideration only the best information to come up with the best possible results.

Sure — there are good appraisers out there with integrity that offer up great analysis. But as lower priced, lower quality work becomes the norm (thanks to the new appraisal guidelines), the best appraisers will seek greener pastures - as well they should.

Lawrence Yun, the NAR Chief Economist, finally got it right when he said, “Sometimes policy can lead to unintended consequences.”

Home sales in May rose from April, the second straightly monthly increase. According to the National Association of Realtors, or NAR, purchases crept up 2.4% from the prior month, which was less than 3.0% analysis were expecting.

Prices continued their decline, falling 17% from a year ago, dragged down by distressed sales.

As readers of this site know, we rarely have much good to say about the NAR. They are a lobbyist group, plain and simple, and typically put the interests of their constituents (Realtors) above that of buyers and sellers. But this month, the NAR hit the nail on the head with respect to the current home buying environment:

“The increase in sales is less than expected because poor appraisals are stalling transactions. Pending home sales indicated much stronger activity, but some contracts are falling through from faulty valuations that keep buyers from getting a loan,” and “Lenders are using appraisers who may not be familiar with a neighborhood, or who compare traditional homes with distressed and discounted sales.”

Bingo. The new appraisal rules are wreaking havoc in the mortgage market, with loans disastrously hard to get thanks to inept appraisers and appraisal management companies. Coupled with rising interest rates, this does not bode well for the nascent housing “recovery.”

This post first appeared on Minyanville.

It appears even the embattled homebuilding industry is getting rosy-eyed, finding enough “green shoots” of economic recovery to stick their shovels back into the ground.

In May, US builders broke ground on 17.2% more projects than in April, far exceeding analysts’ expectations. Work on new apartment buildings leaped, while single-family starts continued what’s now become a 3-month rally.

Although the aggregate figure is still well off last year’s rate, economists are breathing a sigh of relief that the worst of the housing market swoon could be behind us. Skeptics, however, are quick to point out that any recovery could be muted, as high levels of inventory, a weak labor market, and mortgage rates that just won’t seem to stay down, could forestall any recovery.

As Kenneth Simonson, chief economist for the Associated General Contractors of America, told the New York Times, “There’s a real possibility [housing starts] will just stall at a low level. If the recent jump in interest rates is sustained, that could choke off buyer enthusiasm for new homes.”

For nearly 4 years, the business of building and selling homes has been, in a word, lousy. As home prices tumbled, the likes of KB Home (KBH), Toll Brothers (TOL) and Lennar (LEN) slashed prices, offered generous incentives, and otherwise bent over backwards to unload inventory. Building all but stalled, jacking up unemployment — particularly in exurbs and sprawling communities whose economies were largely based on the construction trade. An industry that grew fat during the boom was forced to slim down, lay off workers, and hibernate, while the market’s violent correction ran its course.

And although a host of small builders have closed up shop, to date, no major US homebuilder has gone under. Consolidation, too, has been scant. The only merger of note was Pulte Home’s (PHM) purchase of Centex (CTX), a marriage that, once consummated, will create the country’s largest builder.

The outlook for those builders that remain — builders that are bleeding cash while pleading with creditors to extend loan terms and waive busted covenants — is bleak. Last week, the National Association of Homebuilders/Wells Fargo Builder Sentiment Survey ticked down after rising far more than expected the month before. Higher interest rates are mostly to blame, as the specter of bigger monthly payments is quelling optimism that the housing market is on the mend.

The reality — an unfortunate one for builders and their employees — is that for the foreseeable future, their services aren’t needed in this country; we have too many homes as it is. Demand for new ones remains weak as communities just a decade old slip into disrepair, and shoddy craftsmanship and half-finished developments scare off prospective buyers.

Builders are also fouling up the nascent housing “recovery” by turning recently completed condominium units into rentals. Even as demand wanes thanks to job losses and tighter budgets, rental inventory is rising. Rents, as a result, are falling. This is great news for tenants, eager to jump on affordable apartments, but bad news for landlords and even homeowners.

One of the most popular arguments posited by housing-market-bottom callers is that in some of the hardest hit areas, prices have gotten so low that investors can scoop up cheap homes and rent them for an attractive return. What they neglect to mention, however, is that this sort of market-clearing activity also increases the supply of rental units, further pressuring home prices. Even in the worst, most washed-out areas, a bottom remains elusive.

This post first appeared on Minyanville.

It’s the government, stupid.

As Washington expands its role in managing the day-to-day operations of American business, companies are increasingly turning their strategic focus to tapping federal cash and lending programs. And despite the strings often attached to government money, many are finding that Uncle Sam is the only game in town during these troubled economic times.

This morning’s Wall Street Journal highlights just how essential lawmakers and regulators have become in America’s new breed of government-directed capitalism. Hunting retailers, farm-equipment manufacturers, and, of course, banks (Bank of America (BAC), Citigroup (C), Wells Fargo (WFC)) and insurance companies are all sidling up to the government trough.

And even as public opinion slowly turns against bureaucrats’ massive intervention into the private economy, Washington insiders are raking in piles of cash. According to the Journal, spending on lobbyists in 2009 could reach $3.3 billion, equal to the total during the 2008 election year. And for good reason: Without representation in Washington, companies just can’t compete.

After the financing arm of Deere & Co. (DE) tapped the FDIC to guarantee $2 billion in debt last December, the Equipment Leasing and Finance Association, a trade group, leapt into action to protect other members. Deere rivals, including Caterpillar (CAT) and a host of smaller firms, weren’t eligible for government-supported debt issuances, so the group’s president asked the Federal Reserve to expand the Troubled Asset Lending Facility to include sales of farm equipment and other machinery.

The Fed acquiesced; the agricultural industry must also be too big to fail.

But not every company has the ear of the Washington power brokers, leaving those forced to go it alone at a distinct disadvantage. Credit is already precious for small businesses, and what little they do have is far more expensive than that of their larger, better-connected rivals. This doesn’t bode well for an economy struggling to drag itself out of recession, since small businesses account for the lion’s share of job growth on the other side of a downturn.

The eventual recovery, which a growing number of optimists predict is just around the corner, could yield a bitter pill for corners of the economy still heavily dependent on government handouts. Although lawmakers vow to support systemically vital companies and industries for as long as needed, at some point Washington must try to take back what it has so generously given.

Witness the market for home loans, where government purchases of mortgage-backed securities have helped keep rates abnormally low. Even without the Fed dumping its Fannie Mae (FNM) and Freddie Mac (FRE) bond portfolio onto the market, rates have risen sharply in the past month, threatening to forestall the nascent “recovery” in the housing market.

Were the Fed to pull back its support of the housing market, rates would skyrocket. This would be politically — not to mention economically — unacceptable.

And while the ideological debate rages over whether Washington bureaucrats are becoming too entrenched in the American economy, businessmen and -women still must get up each morning, head to work, and try to stay above water. And — insofar as lobbying for government money outstrips developing new technologies or innovating, producing and otherwise generating economic output — the economy suffers.

And green shoots or no, this economy already has enough cards stacked against it.

This post first appeared on Minyanville.

In early 2006, when subprime powerhouse New Century went bust, vulture investors began to salivate at the opportunities a collapsing mortgage market would offer up like manna from the trading gods. They started raising money. And lots of it.

Billions were poured into so-called “mortgage opportunity funds,” which planned to pick through the wreckage of the once-high-flying housing market. Some investors aimed to focus on mortgage-backed securities, hoping to buy in at pennies on the dollar so just a few bond payments would reap sizable returns. Others, however, delved into the realm of whole loans, buying troubled mortgages from floundering banks.

As noted in the Wall Street Journal this morning, an investment strategy that seemed like a slam dunk on paper — buying distressed mortgages on the cheap, and working out equitable arrangements with borrowers — has proven extremely difficult to execute.

The prevailing wisdom was that, as delinquencies rose, and banks amassed a seemingly limitless portfolio of troubled loans, the likes of JP Morgan Chase (JPM), Bank of America (BAC) and Citigroup (C) would be forced to unload assets at firesale prices. Because they were buying at super-low prices, investors expected to have the necessary cushion to forgive principal, lower interest rates, or otherwise get borrowers back on track. They would, of course, earn a hefty profit for the effort.

But the housing market, which tumbled further and faster than all but the most pessimistic experts thought possible, had other plans.

Throughout 2007, any player that dipped a toe into the market lost a foot. Property value declines accelerated, securities prices tumbled, and economic conditions continued to deteriorate. Sellers, hoping for a rebound, were reluctant to accept lowball prices. Few trades were executed, and the lack of liquidity drove the market to new lows.

Then, in 2008, as delinquencies began to spread from the subprime to the prime market, home prices continued to slide, and it became clear there would be no easy fix to the housing market’s woes, big banks recognized their need to raise capital by selling assets.

The market for distressed loans began to flourish as liquidity entered the market: Sellers accepted painfully low prices, and investors started deploying more capital. Prices for pools of mortgages in various stages of default began to stabilize, typically around $.50-$.60 on the dollar.

As 2008 rolled along, the wheels of the financial markets truly lost their grip on the road, Washington stepped in with the Troubled Asset Relief Program (or TARP) in October. In the distressed mortgage market, uncertainty became the rule of the day, as buyers and sellers alike ceased trading in expectation of new clearing prices created by an asset purchase program that never came.

Traders then sat on the sidelines as the election played out, waiting to see how front-runner Barack Obama’s promised foreclosure moratorium would impact the housing market.

Meanwhile, Uncle Sam poured capital into banks to try and jumpstart lending. With taxpayers bailing out the market’s most leveraged players, Morgan Stanley (MS), Goldman Sachs (GS) and other Wall Street firms got a reprieve from bets gone awry.

Distressed investors hoped banks would finally be willing accept low prices for their assets. Not so. Just when it looked like a few select sellers were going to test the waters of the distressed market, the new Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner announced the Public-Private Investment Program (or PPIP).

The PPIP — a bastardized version of TARP that employs leverage, and is purported to profit both taxpayers and private investors — is yet to materialize.

The distressed whole loan market remains largely frozen, as sellers hope for higher prices from buyer’s backed by cheap government money. Buyers, meanwhile, remain cautious, since, despite recent “positive” datapoints coming out of the housing market, real-estate prices remain volatile in most markets.

The private market for delinquent mortgages once held the potential for a market-based solution to the country’s housing woes. It was no magic bullet, to be sure. But by fostering an environment where private capital could seek out advantageous investments, housing markets would have started down the path towards true price discovery.

As it happened, however, massive government intervention into the market via TARP, the foreclosure moratorium, the PPIP, and other programs forestalled the inevitable, pushing the date of the eventual recovery years into the future.

This is good news for banks that survived the maelstrom of financial market turmoil, albeit based largely on trumped-up earnings and unrealistic asset prices still on their balance sheets. For homeowners, consumers, and the public in general, however, true hope for a legitimate stabilization in housing markets, and the economy in general, has been pushed further along the curve.

By ANDREW JEFFERY

This post first appeared on Minyanville.

Mortgage guidelines have become increasingly strict — not to mention regimented — as the private secondary-mortgage market has all but disappeared in the past 24 months. But according to the Wall Street Journal, appraisals are increasingly becoming one of the biggest hurdles for new purchase and refinance transactions.

In the wake of the recent collapse in home prices, appraisers have come under fire for bowing to lender demands during the boom, offering up property values more aligned with lenders’ wishes than with reality. In 2007, the state of New York sued Washington Mutual — now owned by JPMorgan (JPM) — for colluding with a subsidiary of First American Corporation to overinflate home values.

Collusion between appraisers and mortgage brokers, real-estate agents, banks, and borrowers helped fuel runaway price appreciation. In response, Fannie Mae (FNM) and Freddie Mac (FRE) — the 2 government-owned giants that control around two-thirds of the mortgage market — issued new guidelines dictating how lenders can select and evaluate appraisals. The new policies went into effect May 1.

To help facilitate the new, tighter rules, lenders are using appraisal management companies, or AMCs, which employ networks of appraisers around the country to provide what purport to be unbiased value analysis. All this, of course, comes at a cost which is ultimately borne by borrowers.

And, in what could be considered ironic if it weren’t so repellent, appraisers are crying foul.

This from a group whose moral backbone during the housing boom most closely resembled that of a jellyfish - one seemingly incapable of preventing its members from being wooed by banks into committing fraud.

An appraisal is simply one person’s opinion of a home’s value on a given day. And although that person is licensed to provide such an opinion, the very nature of an appraisal renders its usefulness as a true risk management tool questionable at best.

The growing use of AMCs, opponents argue, reduces appraisal quality even as it increases costs. Appraisers are selected based on proprietary quality scoring mechanisms employed by each AMC, which may or may not be a good measure of reliability. And since AMCs take on average a 40% cut on the total appraisal fees and lenders demand quick turnaround, appraisers are working for less on a tighter timeline.

Sure, fraud may be reduced, but incompetence could more than make up for that as AMCs scramble to employ barely capable appraisers in order to ensure complete geographic coverage for their clients.

The real losers in all this — as is the case when poorly conceived regulation is aimed at making up for past mistakes without proper consideration for the root cause of those mistakes — are homeowners, who must now pay more for a property valuation mechanism that isn’t likely to be much better than the old one.

This post first appeared on Minyanville.

Despite the best efforts of the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department, the free market is winning the battle over mortgage rates. Tens of trillions of dollars in support for the financial system can’t change the stark reality: Giving out home loans remains risky business.

Borrowers looking to take advantage of rock-bottom interest rates are seeing the opportunity slip through their fingers, as rates have risen by more than 0.50% in the past few weeks.

According to the Wall Street Journal, the pop in rates is due to expectations of economic recovery, combined with fears that the mounting pile of debt incurred by Washington’s central economic planners may not be sustainable. As the government prints money and plunges the country into an ever-deeper deficit, holders of US Treasuries (e.g. China) are getting skittish. These investors are quietly demanding a higher return on their bet that our economy will pull out of its current tailspin.

This, in turn, is pushing up mortgage rates, which doesn’t bode well for nascent signs of recovery. Big lenders like Wells Fargo (WFC), Bank of America (BAC) and JPMorgan Chase (JPM) — despite offloading nearly all default risk to taxpayers via Fannie Mae (FNM), Freddie Mac (FRE), or the Federal Housing Administration — are asking prospective borrowers to pony up hefty points up front to get the lowest rate possible.

And this at a time when pundits and performance-chasing portfolio managers are latching onto the absurd notion that the nation’s housing market is making some sort of fundamentally sound turnaround. A contributor to CNBC actually said with a straight face that our economy can’t grow with mortgage rates this “high,” and that the Fed is derailing the recovery by letting rates move up.

To say that our economy is undergoing some sort of legitimate recovery, and at the same time assert mortgage rates a hair above 5% are too high is to confirm that those declaring the recession in our rear view mirror are delusional at best, talking their book at worst.

As renewed fears of inflation percolate and investors begin to snatch up commodities in expectation of future prices, pressure will mount on the Fed to keep rates of all kinds low to ensure the economy doesn’t remain mired in its current malaise. This means more printing press activity, more “quantitative” easing, and more social-welfare programs packaged as “progressive” economic policy.

Battle lines are being drawn: Washington bureaucrats on one side, advancing the theory that money can be printed seemingly without limit to generate legitimate economic growth - and the market on the other. And each time the Fed takes its foot off the dollar-debasement accelerator, we get a peek into what will happen when the printing presses finally run out of ink.