By ANDREW JEFFERY

This post first appeared on Minyanville.

Countrywide was to subprime lending what Thornburg Mortgage was to jumbo-prime.

Now, both are out of business.

Thornburg said it expects to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, ending a nearly 2-year struggle to fend off creditors and survive the credit crunch. The company, once the country’s second largest independent mortgage lender, specialized in making jumbo loans to borrowers perceived to have little credit risk. Ever since the market for its mortgage-backed securities evaporated in the summer of 2007, however, Thornurg has been under siege.

In what now seems like ancient history, Countrywide nearly collapsed as its short-term commercial papers seized up, and investors fled Thornburg in droves. The Federal Reserve stepped in and shocked the market back to life, but the revival was short-lived. Enough damage had been done that any financial institution holding even highly rated securities backed by residential mortgages had a target on its back.

Thornburg’s stock was delisted last December as a series of last-ditch efforts by CEO Larry Goldstone failed to save the company. With investors buying nothing by government-backed Fannie Mae (FNM) and Freddie Mac (FRE) mortgages, Thornburg’s bread and butter — jumbo loans — became virtually worthless.

Although Thornburg’s demise was a foregone conclusion months ago, the fate of a company many once believed immune illustrates how far we’ve come from what began as a “subprime” problem.

High-end real estate is now fully engaged in the nation’s housing slump. Prime loans are souring faster than subprime ones as job losses spread up the socioeconomic ladder. Manhattan’s real-estate market is in the news again, as sales continue to plunge and prices follow suit.

Here in the San Francisco Bay Area, where expensive homes dominate many markets, high-end buying activity has slowed to a trickle. The chart below, from Cirios Real Estate shows purchases over $1,000,000 since the broader housing market peaked in 2005. Even without the statistical wizardry of seasonal adjusting the data, the trend is clear: America’s wealthy aren’t buying.

click to enlarge

Sales figures don’t look much better in the first quarter of this year, even though broad sales activity is up month-over-month. The bifurcation of the real-estate market continues, as troubles in the high end are picking up the slack while low-end markets grope for a bottom.

Foreclosures are even happening in some of the country’s wealthiest communities. In many of these markets, denial reigns as owners clong to the belief that the slump is temporary, their paper losses transitory. But as deleveraging continues, asset prices continue to fall, and forced liquidations creep towards the very wealthy, reality is slowly setting in.

By ANDREW JEFFERY

This post first appeared on Minyanville.

$100 billion just isn’t what it used to be.

Over the weekend, Freddie Mac (FRE) requested a second draw on its Treasury Department credit facility, saying $30-35 billion would suffice to keep its net worth above zero, thank you very much. After taking $14 billion in the third quarter of last year, Freddie has now chewed through almost half its $100 billion taxpayer-provided safety net in just 5 months.

According to Bloomberg, Freddie’s fourth -quarter operating losses triggered the need for additional funds, as its massive mortgage portfolio continues to sour. Analysts expect Freddie’s sister company, Fannie Mae (FNM), to request a similar draw when it announces fourth-quarter results in February.

As one analyst told Bloomberg, “[Fannie and Freddie’s] losses are going to be much higher than anyone anticipated. The more and more that people are digging into these portfolios, they’re finding out the more and more these guys were doing subprime and Alt-A loans and classifying them as prime.”

Defaults on prime mortgages, which are supposed to be given out to borrowers with good credit and stable jobs, are now increasing at a faster rate than the subprime loans that get so much headline play. According to the latest Mortgage Bankers Association Delinquency Survey, 2.87% of all prime loans were delinquent in the third quarter of last year, up 85% from the same period a year ago.

Keep in mind those figures are through September 2008 and don’t include the abysmal economic conditions of the past 4 months. And as layoffs mount and the economy continues to contract, the previously well-to-do are facing the same economic hardships those “subprime” people have been dealing with for almost 2 years.

Fannie and Freddie, despite not technically being involved in subprime lending, drove industry trends, and, in many ways, set precedents followed by the rest of the mortgage industry. Their drive to automate the loan underwriting process created massive opportunities for fraud. Both savvy and ignorant originators easily duped the system, jamming subprime borrowers into prime loans, which neatly showed up on bank balance sheets as AAA-rated assets.

The sieve-like automated systems were adopted by other big lenders, such as Countrywide, Washington Mutual, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, IndyMac and Wachovia.

Now that none of those firms exist, loans originated under the guise of “prime” are turning out to be anything but. Bank of America (BAC), JPMorgan (JPM) and Wells Fargo (WFC), heretofore the strongest banks in the country, who absorbed many of those defunct lenders, are now faced with mounting losses on loans they thought were of the highest quality.

As I noted about this time last year, while everyone was so focused on subprime, prime mortgages — a market about 4 times as large — quietly presented a far bigger threat to the financial system. Now, as the government has bailed out 2 of the 4 remaining big American banks, those loans threaten the federal balance sheet.

Where’s TARP 2 when you need it?

This post first appeared on Minyanville.

The mortgage bailout parade marches on.

Just days after rival Bank of America (BAC) announced plans to modify hundreds of thousands of mortgages, JPMorgan (JPM) released details of a homeowner rescue plan of its own on Friday afternoon.

Following its takeover of both Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual, JPMorgan’s inventory of distressed mortgages has risen dramatically in the last 8 months. The bank’s modification efforts, which mirror Bank of America’s plan, are focused largely on subprime loans and option ARMs. The acquisition of WaMu saddled CEO Jamie Dimon’s firms with billions of these loans - $16 and $54 billion, respectively, according to the Wall Street Journal.

JPMorgan plans to identify borrowers with both the willingness and ability to pay, lower interest rates and, in some cases, forgive loan principal. For Option ARMs, borrowers may have the opportunity to replace their negatively amortizing mortgage with a safer, fixed rate 30-year loan.

Look out for more of these plans coming from the remaining big American banks, particularly Wells Fargo (WFC): Its recent acquisition of Wachovia (WB) included the Charlotte-based bank’s massive option ARM portfolio.

The plan is certainly a step in the right direction. It’s nice to see that some of the recent $25 billion injection from the government will be funneled toward the taxpayers that ponied up the money in the first place.

Both JPMorgan and Bank of America’s new programs, are, however, evidence of the government’s – and banks’ — inclination to deal with problems that already exist, rather than ones that are on the horizon.

This post first appeared on Minyanville and our sister site Dawn Patrol.

It looks like all those short-sellers might have been on to something.

Freddie Mac (FRE), the beleaguered mortgage giant that was just weeks ago on the brink of collapse, released second quarter results this morning that were nothing short of abysmal. Along with the financial backing of you, me and all the other US taxpayers, the government-sponsored enterprise now has:

• $831 million loss or $1.63 per share, compared with net income of $729 million a year ago.
• Revenue fell 28% to $1.69 billion compared to last year.
• $2.5 billion in credit loss provisions and $1 billion in mortgage-related writedowns.
• Board approval to slash dividends from $0.25 per share to “$0.05 or less”.
• The intention to raise $5.5 billion or more in fresh capital.

Although the company currently meets capital requirements demanded by its regulator, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, it may fall below those levels if the housing and credit markets continue to deteriorate.

Last month, shares plunged on fears that Freddie and its larger cousin Fannie Mae (FNM) would crumble under the weight of mounting losses in their massive mortgage portfolios. The Treasury Department tried to shore up confidence by demanding Congressional approval to support the 2 companies, should the need arise.

Treasury announced this week it had hired Morgan Stanley (MS) to help sort out the mess and assess the two companies’ financial positions.

It takes a very active imagination to think a company capitalized with just $37 billion to support more than $2 trillion in U.S. mortgage debt is anything resembling stable.

Although Fannie and Freddie managed to avoid buying the worst of the subprime mortgages originated during the housing boom, many equally toxic Alt-A and other non-prime loans made it onto their balance sheets. Even marginally savvy originators were able to exploit their automated underwriting and risk systems, resulting in the loss of billions of dollars from questionable loans.

Fannie and Freddie are now paying for their transgressions – or rather, the American taxpayer is paying, since Congress gave Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson what amounts to a blank check to bail out the two failed companies.

The only questions left are: When will Fannie and Freddie collapse, and what form will they take thereafter?

Many advocate for privatization, splitting the firms into several publicly traded companies. Others, mindful of the Federal government’s tendency to privatize profits and socialize losses, expect outright nationalization.

One near-certainty, irrespective of the outcome of their current crisis, is that Fannie and Freddie’s ability to keep mortgages rates artificially low will be greatly reduced. That doesn’t bode well for anyone considering buying a house in the next 20 years.