By ANDREW JEFFERY

This post first appeared on Minyanville.

“If at first you don’t succeed, try, try again” – and you certainly can’t fault lawmakers for a lack of persistence in trying to stem the epidemic foreclosures plaguing America’s housing market.

Sadly, they insist on trying the same failed strategies over and over again.

For more than 18 months now, Congress has resolutely believed loan modifications are the path out of the housing jungle. But despite a blitzkrieg of public-relations campaigns and benevolent-sounding foreclosure-prevention programs like “Hope for Homeowners,” “HOPE NOW” and the latest, the Federal Reserve’s “Homeownership Preservation Policy,” modification efforts continue to sputter.

Even private-sector programs announced by big banks like Citigroup (C) and Bank of America (BAC) have had only marginal success.

After months of relentless pressure from the House and Senate alike, the Fed’s new policy allows it to review loans supporting the assets it purchased after it rescued Bear Stearns and AIG (AIG) for potential modifications. Barney Frank, the House Financial Services Committee Chairman, told reporters yesterday, “This is a very big deal.”

Actually, Mr. Frank, it’s not.

The assets acquired when the Fed and Treasury Department backed the JPMorgan (JPM) buyout of Bear Stearns and nationalized AIG were derivatives, not actual loans. These mortgage-backed securities are supported by thousands of individual mortgages, while the interest in those underlying loans was sliced up and allocated to countless securities, derivatives, and derivatives of derivatives.

Securities owners can’t modify mortgages: The rules about altering loan terms are pre-determined in securitization documents. It’s left up to loan servicers to implement the rules, whether the security owners like it or not.

Nevertheless, according to Bloomberg, the Fed — after identifying which loans it holds a fractional interest in — will encourage the servicers of those residential mortgage-backed securities “to implement a loan modification program that is consistent with this policy.”

Congress, Treasury and now the Fed have been trying to months now to get servicers on board with modification efforts, to no avail. Even the FDIC, whose highly touted modification program is being tried out at defunct California thrift IndyMac, has been unable to successfully – and sustainably — modify loans en masse.

The reason modification efforts aren’t working — amid evidence that Washington continues to ignore the root of the housing problem — is that the vast majority of loan defaults are being caused by job losses and negative equity. Borrowers can’t get a new loan without a job, nor can they qualify for a modification if they owe more on their house than it’s worth.

According to data released by JPMorgan yesterday, average equity for subprime loans stands at less than 5%.


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It’s negative for all Alt-A adjustable rate mortgages.



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Average equity in jumbo prime loans, which are experiencing defaults at faster rates than either subprime or Alt-A, has tumbled from 45% in January 2006 to less than 20% at the end of last year.


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And, even as regulators force mortgage rates down to record lows to encourage buyers to step in — catching the falling knife of tumbling home prices and risking financial ruin for the benefit of the rest of us — property values continue to fall.

Meanwhile, regulators and lawmakers continue to parade bold foreclosure-prevention efforts before the public. And they’ll keep trying – even if it bankrupts the country.

By ANDREW JEFFERY

This post first appeared on Minyanville.

It’s wishful thinking that artificially low interest rates alone are enough to rehabilitate the housing market.

The mortgage industry has undergone a swift and ruthless downsizing over the past 18 months. While a necessary part of the corrective process, the market is ill-equipped to handle the onslaught of new loans that regulators are hoping to incite.

Last week, the Wall Street Journal reported the Treasury Department is considering pushing down mortgage rates to levels not seen since the heyday of the housing bubble. Through the recently nationalized mortgage giants, Fannie Mae (FNM) and Freddie Mac (FRE), loans would be offered to qualified homebuyers with rates as low as 4.5%.

The story sparked a wave of refinancing as rates on all types of mortgages tumbled. Coupled with the Federal Reserve’s plans to buy agency debt and freshly originated mortgage-backed securities, the stage is set for renewed buying activity.

Although Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson has since denied that he’s planning such a move, he did say that he’s “always looking at new ideas” and that “the key thing to get us through this period is getting housing prices down.”

Whether there’s an official program of 4.5% mortgages is immaterial, as Washington is doing everything in its power to push rates as low as possible.

It’s hard to argue cheaper mortgages won’t encourage buyers to leave the sidelines and jump into the market. However, as Bloomberg noted this morning, layoffs at mortgage companies and banks like Citigroup (C), JPMorgan (JPM) and Bank of America (BAC) have greatly diminshed origination capacity. Lenders, having already tightened underwriting standards, have limited resources to process new applications.

Many are hoping low rates will encourage refinancing and help clear out the toxic subprime and Alt-A securities still plaguing the financial system. Unfortunately, the loans originated for securities in 2005, 2006 and 2007 – the ones causing all the trouble — were done with minimal down-payment requirements. Falling home prices mean most of these borrowers are underwater - and thus unable to refinance.

Furthermore, any renewed buying is likely to be met with a flood of new supply. There’s a concept in real estate known as “phantom inventory,” which refers to homeowners who want to sell, but keep their homes off the market while they hope for conditions to improve. Some experts believe actual inventory levels, when these would-be sellers are taken into account, is as much as 25% higher than official data show.

Anecdotally, this makes sense. For each buyer waiting for lower prices to step in, there’s a seller waiting for a better market. So any pop in buying activity will offer sellers an opportunity to list their homes in a seemingly stronger market. As foreclosures continue to spread into previously unaffected areas, inventory levels are likely to remain high throughout much of the country.

And while attractively-priced, well-maintained homes in desirable neighborhoods will continue to sell, more of the same will be available in each successive month. Patience remains the best ally for the prospective buyer.

This post first appeared on Minyanville and our sister site Dawn Patrol.

The bailout is done! Time to breathe a sigh of relief.

Or is it?

As details emerge about the financial bailout package that was jammed through Congress over 10 days of political theater at its most nauseating, there’s still a striking omission from the plan to right American’s economic ship.

The failure of bureaucrats and regulators to propose a realistic solution for the foreclosure problem is emblematic of their inability to treat the root cause of an issue, focusing instead on simply applying band-aids to the visible symptoms.

The bailouts of Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae (FNM) and Freddie Mac (FRE), and AIG (AIG) all claimed to remove the cancer – but all they did was hasten the patient’s demise.

Treasury’s plan will deliver money into the banking system to sop up toxic assets sitting on the balance sheets of our financial institutions. This is a necessary — albeit unfortunate — step, but it still doesn’t address the root of the rot: Milions of homes are worth less than the outstanding balance of the owner’s mortgage.

Billions of dollars in negative equity are destroying Main Street’s balance sheet even as it devours Wall Street, eroding the value of the very securities Taxpayers are about to start buying.

As long as Washington tries to fight foreclosures with ineffective loan modification programs that simply prolong the problems, foreclosures will continue to set records. Modifying a mortgage for someone who is barely scraping by is sort of like rescuing him from the side of a cliff, only to leave him on the edge, dangling by one arm.

Foreclosures are often blamed for spiraling home prices and the resulting collapse in value of securities tied to the mortgages used to buy those houses. According to Bloomberg, the government’s aid package is designed to support “financial companies reeling from the record number of home foreclosures.”

Foreclosures don’t cause houses to lose their value. Foreclosures happen when a home loses value such that it’s worth less than the mortgage used to buy it, and the homeowner can’t sell or refinance if his interest payments become overwhelming.

Defaults become delinquencies, which become foreclosures, which become evictions, which become repossessions, which flood the market, depressing prices as supply outstrips demand.

Back in what seems like ancient history, when home prices only went up, banks weren’t too concerned with defaults, since homeowners could almost always sell themselves out of a problem. Foreclosures stayed low because the liquid, appreciating housing market bailed out troubled homeowners on its own. That’s part of the reason the industry is so ill-equipped to handle the scope of the current problem: it never had to before.

But now, with so many borrowers underwater — owing more on their house than it’s worth — defaults result in not only eventual liquidation of the property, but profound distress in the homeowner’s life and real losses for investors. Furthermore, delinquent borrowers are less inclined to pay for upkeep or security, and many foreclosed homes are seriously damaged by the time a bank is able to take possession of it.

Being underwater is debilitating. To sell, not only does a homeowner have to pay a Realtor 6% whether he gets a raw deal or not, but he has to pay the bank the difference between where his home sells and the outstanding balance of his loan.

For many who have seen the value of their homes fall hundreds of thousands of dollars, this is an impossibility. Most homeowners, once they’re upside down, just want to stay in their homes.

A more effective plan to curb foreclosures would require an independent reviewer to evaluate each delinquent mortgage, determine the borrower’s ability to pay going forward and the amount, if any, of negative equity that needs to be destroyed to bring the loan amount back under the home’s value.

Since the notion that buying Wall Street’s toxic assets will result in windfall profits is a willfully distributed fallacy aimed at getting the public on board for the bailout, Taxpayers would be well-served dumping money into a blender that’s at least in their own backyard.

British Prime Minister Gordon Brown recently proposed a similar plan, where the government will buy delinquent mortgages from banks for the outstanding balance of the loan. The home is then rented to the existing tenant or a new one and managed by a local housing association.

The government would absorb the difference between the loan amount and the resale value, which would hasten increase sales activity, clearing out the glut of homes listed too high for the simple reason that the owner can’t afford to sell at a lower price.

This type of personalized bailout, unfortunately, reeks of moral hazard. Many individuals who made bad financial decisions will get to keep their homes, albeit without actual ownership. But the current socialization of our free markets is simply moral hazard be design, so if Congress is so hell-bent on bailing out Wall Street, why not share the spoils with Main Street.

If Congress wants this bailout to help the American people and keep the financial system in tact, a sizable portion of the funds should be directed at fixing the asset that’s at the center of this turmoil: the residential property.

Home prices need to come down further. They will come down further. It’s only a matter of time. We can either let home prices bleed down, slowly eroding the value of the securities they support and violently uprooting families, or the government can plug the hole.

Washington Mutual (WM) is already off the field, as JP Morgan (JPM) continues to play widowmaker for the financial system. Wachovia (WB) isn’t likely to remain independent for long. The sooner the rebuilding process begins, the better.

This crisis, and the resulting ebb and flow of what remains of the free market has already tipped the scales, started us sliding down a path of deflation in everything from stock prices, to cereal boxes, soda bottles, not to mention homes.

This is a good development. The hardest lesson Americans will learn from this crisis, should learn from this crisis, is that sometimes it’s necessary to live within our means. There is virtue in simplicity. More is not always better. Bigger is not always better. Sometimes, amazingly enough, less is often better.

This progress is the only true way we’ll make it out of this mess.